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BREAKING BUCKS IN MONEY MARKET FUNDS 
WILLIAM A. BIRDTHISTLE*
   This Article argues that the Securities and Exchange Commission’s 
first and most significant response to the economic crisis increases rather 
than decreases the likelihood of future failures in money market funds and 
the broader capital markets. In newly promulgated regulations addressing the 
“breaking of the buck” in the $3 trillion money market—a debacle at the 
fulcrum of the 2008 financial meltdown—the SEC endorses practices that 
obfuscate rather than illuminate the capital markets, including fixed pricing 
for money market funds, potentially riskier portfolio requirements, and the 
continued use of discredited ratings agencies. These policies, premised 
implicitly upon doubt in the ability of markets to process information 
effectively, obscure the true perils of money market funds. Rather than 
swaddling investment risks in misleading regulatory padding, the SEC should 
illuminate the possible menace of these funds. This Article offers transparent 
solutions to alleviate moral hazard and systemic risk in the broader market 
and to end the regulatory subsidy of these specific investments. 
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[T]he tenets that define a money market fund: sanctity of 
principal, immediate liquidity, a reasonable rate of return–
all while living under the overarching rubric of boring 
investors into a sound sleep.  
—Bruce R. Bent, Chairman and CEO, The Reserve1
 
 
[The Reserve] didn’t just break the buck, they shattered it. 
—Don Phillips, Managing Director, Morningstar 2
INTRODUCTION 
 
The menace of the 2008 financial crisis grew most alarming not 
with the failure of exotic derivatives but with the malfunction of far more 
mundane and reliable financial instruments: money market mutual funds, 
sanctuary to more than $3 trillion dollars of America’s most conservative 
investments.3
 
 1. Letter from Bruce R. Bent, Chairman & CEO, The Reserve, to Investors 
(Jan. 25, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov.Archieves/edgar/data/83335/ 
000110465908008455/a08-1786_1ncsrs.htm; see also, Floyd Norris, Pride Goeth Before 
a Fall, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2008, 8:24 PM), http://norris.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2008/09/16/pride-goeth-before-a-fall/?emc=eta1(stating that “[w]hat is most amazing is 
the way bragging goes before a fall” and quoting parts of Bent’s aphorism present in two 
letters Bent sent to Reserve shareholders directly before the breaking of the buck in the 
Reserve’s Primary Fund). 
 
 2. Sam Mamudi & Jonathan Burton, Money Market Breaks the Buck, Freezes 
Redemptions, MARKETWATCH (Sept. 17, 2008, 9:11 AM), 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/money-market-fund-breaks-the-buck-freezes-
redemptions (“The size and speed of the withdrawals was stunning. At 3 p.m. on 
Tuesday, Primary Fund’s assets stood at $23 billion, a $40 billion hit from the $62.6 
billion in the fund on Friday . . . .”).  
 3. See INV. CO. INST., 2010 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 160 tbl.37 
(50th ed. 2010) [hereinafter ICI FACT BOOK] (listing total net assets of all U.S. money 
market funds as $3,316,196,000,000 as of 2009). 
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Subprime mortgage stresses metastasized into systemic threats on 
September 16, 2008,4 when one of the nation’s oldest and largest money 
market funds—the Reserve Primary Fund5—broke the buck.6 For only 
the second time in history,7 a money market fund failed to return one 
hundred cents on the dollar to its investors. To investors who considered 
these funds as safe as bank savings accounts, this startling breach of faith 
triggered dramatic exit, prompting a run of hundreds of billions of dollars 
not just on the Primary Fund, but also across the entire money market 
industry.8 Dysfunction in money market funds cascaded into credit 
markets, as funds liquidated their holdings and deprived corporations of 
lenders willing to extend vital credit for day-to-day business operations.9 
Within days, the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the Federal 
Reserve intervened to thaw the frozen fund industry, credit markets, and 
broader capital markets by announcing that the United States of America 
would temporarily guarantee all eight hundred money market funds 
against losses of up to $50 billion per fund.10
 
 4. See HENRY M. PAULSON, JR., ON THE BRINK 228–37 (2010) (“I [then-
Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson] feared the start of a run on the $3.5 trillion 
industry . . . .”). 
 One year later, on 
 5. See Press Release, The Reserve (Sept. 16, 2008). (“[T]he NAV of the 
Primary Fund, effective as of 4:00PM, is $0.97 per share.”).  
 6. See Diya Gullapalli et al., Money Fund, Hurt by Debt Tied to Lehman, 
Breaks the Buck, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2008, at C1 (noting that the “huge money-market 
fund, the Reserve Primary Fund,” had broken the buck, marking “the first time one of 
these conservative funds has had a loss in 14 years”). 
 7. In 1994, the Community Bankers U.S. Government Fund—an institutional, 
non-retail fund—became the first money market fund to break the buck, returning ninety-
six cents per share. David Evans, Unsafe Havens, BLOOMBERG MARKETS (Oct. 2007), 
http://bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=nw&pname=mm_1007_story2.html; John 
Waggoner, Billions Stream into Ultrasafe Government Funds, USA TODAY, Aug. 22, 
2007, at 9A (opining that the fund was “tiny” and that “[m]ost analysts suggest that 
worries about money funds . . . are unfounded”). 
 8. See LAWRENCE G. MCDONALD WITH PATRICK ROBINSON, A COLOSSAL 
FAILURE OF COMMON SENSE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE COLLAPSE OF LEHMAN BROTHERS 
325 (2009) (noting the demise of Lehman Brothers and the resulting decisions that 
“would obliterate the world’s economy”). 
 9. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE CRISIS OF CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY 
42–47 (2010). On the interaction of money market funds and the credit markets 
generally, see MATTHEW P. FINK, THE RISE OF MUTUAL FUNDS: AN INSIDER’S VIEW 77–94 
(2008); MARCIA STIGUM & ANTHONY CRESCENZI, STIGUM’S MONEY MARKET 1110–15 
(4th ed., 2007). 
 10. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces 
Guaranty Program for Money Market Funds (Sept. 19, 2008), available at 
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1147.htm (announcing the authorization of “the 
assets of the Exchange Stabilization Fund for up to $50 billion to guarantee” each money 
market fund).  
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September 18, 2009,11 the government terminated this guarantee. In its 
place, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) promulgated a 
new set of rules12 in February 2010 intended to “strengthen the resiliency 
of money market funds.”13
The SEC’s new money market rules are important both because 
they dramatically affect a broad and important swath of credit and capital 
markets, and because they may serve as a portent for extensive new SEC 
rulemaking to come. The money market regulations were among the 
SEC’s first significant reactions to the financial crisis of 2008; the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010
 
14
Yet the SEC’s regulatory response to the misadventures in money 
market funds is troubling for several reasons and warrants careful 
attention. First, the SEC’s approach embodies a conception of financial 
regulation almost entirely at odds with leading economic and legal 
theory. Rather than remain agnostic as to the merit of specific 
investments (as neoclassical economic theory would require)
 will 
require scores of new SEC rules across the entire financial landscape. 
15 or 
privilege the choice of socially optimal investments (as behavioral theory 
would encourage),16
 
 11. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces 
Expiration of Guaranty Program for Money Market Funds (Sept. 18, 2009), available at 
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg293.htm. 
 the SEC appears instead to have picked the money 
market fund—an increasingly problematic and vulnerable investment 
mechanism—as the specific winner in this marketplace. Second, the 
SEC’s new rules fundamentally misapprehend the operational dynamics 
of money market funds, credit markets, and the sensitive interaction of 
the two. By reducing and thus accelerating the required maturity of 
portfolio holdings in money market funds and mandating the industry’s 
 12. See Money Market Fund Reform Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 10,060 (Mar. 4, 
2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 274). 
 13. Mary Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, Statement on Money Market Funds Before 
the Open Commission Meeting, Jan. 27, 2010, available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/speech/2010/spch012710mls-mmf.htm. 
 14. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 15. See generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW (7th ed. 2007); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The 
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984). 
 16. See generally David Hirshleifer, The Blind Leading the Blind: Social 
Influence, Fads, and Information Cascades, in THE NEW ECONOMICS OF HUMAN 
BEHAVIOR 188 (Mariano Tonmasi & Kathryn Ierulli eds., 1995); Amos Tversky & Daniel 
Kahneman, Introduction to JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 
(Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982); Christine Jolls & Cass R. 
Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199 (2006); Dan M. Kahan & 
Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 149 
(2006). 
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continued reliance upon ratings agencies whose abysmal performance 
has been widely condemned, the new rules increase rather than decrease 
the likelihood of future runs on money market funds and consequential 
failures of the credit markets. Third, notwithstanding the widely 
unpopular fact that the rescue of failures of these instruments required 
pledges of billions of dollars of public money, regulators failed to adopt 
any insurance facility—public or private—to underwrite future 
emergencies in this field.17
To appreciate the ramifications of the SEC’s decisions, one must 
begin with an appreciation for the operations of money market funds. 
Internally, and at their most fundamental, money market funds are 
simply a species of investment fund like any other collective investment 
vehicle.
 As a response to the recent failure of money 
market funds, the SEC’s action is inadequate; as a prophylaxis against 
their future dysfunction, it may indeed be counterproductive. 
18 While hedge funds, private equity funds, venture capital funds, 
and certain mutual funds regularly invest in high-risk, high-reward 
securities for their portfolios, money market funds are characterized by 
their comparative conservatism. Indeed, the managers of these funds 
specifically promote them as low-risk, low-reward financial havens—
cash equivalents even—and often build portfolios of only the safest and 
most highly rated securities issued by governments and large 
corporations.19 Nevertheless, as the failure of the Primary Fund 
demonstrated so vividly, money market funds are neither risk-free nor 
insured against loss.20
When regulating a potentially dangerous investment, financial 
authorities may choose from an array of neoclassical, behavioral, or 
prudential approaches. That is, they may: (a) offer neither 
encouragement nor discouragement of the particular investment but 
require issuers to disclose clearly the dangers to the investing public, 
thereby allowing market mechanisms to reward or punish the investment 
(the neoclassical approach);
 Moreover, in light of the government’s rapid and 
massive bailout, the absence of salutary modifications to these funds is 
likely to increase moral hazard and future systemic risk in this investing 
arena. 
21
 
 17. See Money Market Fund Reform Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 10,061–62. 
 (b) promote to investors alternative, ideally 
more socially beneficial, investments while permitting sophisticated, 
fully informed investors to select riskier investments if they so choose 
 18. See Money Market Fund Reform Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,688, 
32,688–89 (July 8, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 274). See generally 
JOSEPH NOCERA, A PIECE OF THE ACTION: HOW THE MIDDLE CLASS JOINED THE MONEY 
CLASS 75–88 (1994). 
 19. See Money Market Fund Reform Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 32,688. 
 20. See id. at 32,688–90. 
 21. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 15, at 480–86. 
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(the behavioral approach);22
Unusual everywhere is the approach the SEC has adopted in the 
case of money market funds, in which it has helped to promote a 
potentially dangerous investment by permitting its sponsors to downplay 
rather than to disclose or eliminate inherent risks. 
 or (c) require the issuer to modify the 
investment to eliminate its dangers as much as possible (the prudential 
approach). In the United States, the neoclassical approach is the model 
most closely associated with our securities laws and regulations. 
Increasingly though, legislators have adopted the behavioral approach. 
The prudential, or merit-based, approach is rare in the field of U.S. 
securities regulation but employed in other market sectors, such as food 
and drugs, and other countries governed with greater regulatory 
command and control. 
With its regulatory support, the SEC has collaborated in the creation 
of an appearance that these investments are as safe as bank deposits 
while as lucrative as mutual funds. The chief source of this similitude is 
the pricing system of money market funds—permitted in no other kind of 
investment fund—which closely resembles that of bank accounts.23 The 
price of a typical mutual fund, known as its net asset value (NAV), is a 
function of the value of its portfolio securities. As the values of 
underlying investments held by a fund continually change, the fund’s 
NAV will typically fluctuate also.24 When money market funds first 
became available in the early 1970s, they too featured this “floating 
NAV.”25 In the late 1970s, however, financial advisors who managed 
these funds persuaded the SEC to permit the use of a fixed NAV.26 By 
employing a method for calculating NAV that does not rely on the daily 
value of portfolio securities (mark-to-market accounting), but instead 
permits the use of values that assume portfolio securities will be held to 
maturity and then fully paid (amortized cost accounting), money market 
funds can maintain a stable NAV of one dollar per share.27
 
 22. See, e.g., Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 16, at 208–16. 
 When this 
 23. See Money Market Fund Reform Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 32,688. 
See generally Viktoria Baklanova, Money Market Funds: An Introduction to the 
Literature (Jan. 26, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1542983. 
 24. William A. Birdthistle, Compensating Power: An Analysis of Rents and 
Rewards in the Mutual Fund Industry, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1401, 1421 (2006). 
 25. See, e.g., Valuation of Debt Instruments and Computation of Current Price 
by Certain Open-End Investment Companies (Money Market Funds), 48 Fed. Reg. 
32,555 (July 18, 1983) (adopting reforms that permitted money market funds to move 
from floating to fixed NAVs). 
 26. See Money Market Fund Reform Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 32,690. 
 27. See Money Market Fund Reform Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 10060, 10,060–
61 (Mar. 4, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 274). 
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pricing scheme is combined with check-writing and ATM privileges,28
Through an infelicitous side effect of misguided regulation in the 
related field of banking law, savings accounts in the late 1970s and early 
1980s were forbidden by Regulation Q
 
money market funds look and feel a great deal more like bank savings 
accounts than the mutual funds they are. 
29 of the Federal Reserve Act30 
from offering an interest rate of greater than 5.25 percent.31
In addition to the effect that such obfuscation has on investors 
within money market funds, the SEC’s newest regulations also possess 
potentially deleterious effects on credit and capital markets outside these 
funds. The new rules are likely to exacerbate the same forces that 
previously conspired to break the buck in money market funds. 
Declining to mitigate the risk in these funds by returning either to a 
floating NAV or to deposit insurance, the SEC has looked elsewhere for 
“risk-limiting conditions” to ensure the safety of the fund’s 
investments.
 Money 
market funds could and did offer much higher returns, while projecting 
the appearance of possessing an equivalent degree of security as bank 
accounts, and thereby attracted massive inflows from investors. Were 
these funds required to use the same pricing system as every other 
mutual fund or to contribute the same deposit insurance premia as bank 
accounts, they would either look a great deal less like those bank 
accounts or generate materially lower but more risk-appropriate yields. 
In essence, without a coherent theoretical justification, the SEC is 
furnishing one particular species of investment with a regulatory subsidy 
that enables these funds to win market share from bank accounts and 
short-term mutual funds by generating higher rewards than the former 
while falsely appearing to carry less risk than the latter. 
32 The SEC has chosen instead to limit the portfolios of 
money market funds to only, or predominantly, securities with maturities 
of very short duration on the theory that shorter-term investments are 
generally less risky than longer-term ones.33 Simultaneously, the SEC 
has reiterated its requirement that funds invest only in securities awarded 
high ratings from four-credit rating agencies on the theory that such a 
system will eliminate the least risky investments.34
 
 28. See Money Market Fund Reform Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 32,688 
(“Commonly offered features, such as check-writing privileges, exchange privileges, and 
near-immediate liquidity, have contributed to the popularity of money market funds.”). 
  
 29. 12 C.F.R. § 225.3 (2009). 
 30. 12 U.S.C. § 371a (2006). 
 31. See generally R. Alton Gilbert, Requiem for Regulation Q: What It Did and 
Why It Passed Away, 68 FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 22 (1986). 
 32. See Money Market Fund Reform Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 10,060–62. 
 33. See id. at 32,690. 
 34. See id. at 32,690 n.27. 
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Both of these suppositions are ill-founded. On the question of 
investment maturity, Professor Jeffrey Gordon argues persuasively that 
shorter maturations will only accelerate future defaults in the event of 
market stresses.35 If borrowers have several weeks to repay loans, the 
market will have more time to react to any developments with those 
loans; if, instead, borrowers must repay or default within only a few 
days, a cascade of defaults may come in a quicker flurry with less time 
for rational reflection and intervention. On the question of ratings 
agencies, Professor Frank Partnoy has extensively catalogued the 
problems of financial systems that rely on misleading credit ratings, 
which have been shown to enhance a false sense of security rather than 
to convey accurate information.36
A compelling alternative fortification for this system would be the 
establishment of a public or private insurance pool to guarantee the 
holdings in money market funds. As Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) insurance has demonstrated, insurance can be an 
effective mechanism for circumventing bank runs.
 The new money market rules are thus 
likely to make future, external effects of money market funds on capital 
markets worse, not better. 
37 All insurance costs 
money, of course, and any premia paid to support future money market 
funds that threaten to break the buck would almost certainly be drawn 
from assets in those funds, thereby reducing their yield and net 
investment returns. When these funds needed insurance during the 2008 
debacle, the federal government provided it free of charge, thus 
rewarding the fund sponsors’ apathy.38 Unless changes are adopted now, 
fund sponsors may reasonably believe that implicit governmental 
insurance will support future failures in money market funds as well. The 
market is thus likely to suffer from the moral hazard of fund sponsors 
who aggressively pursue ever-higher returns without internalizing the 
costs of such risky management.39
In Part I of this Article, I discuss the economic and legal 
development of money market funds in the United States, the specific 
internal financial dynamics of money market funds that precipitated the 
 
 
 35. Comment Letter from Jeffrey N. Gordon, Professor, Columbia Law School, 
to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC (Sept. 9, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/ (select “Search”, search “Gordon” and “comment letter”). 
 36. Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs 
Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 654–79 (1999) [hereinafter 
Partnoy, Siskel and Ebert]. 
 37. See generally Christian A. Johnson, Justice and the Administrative State: 
The FDIC and the Superior Bank Failure, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 483 (2005). 
 38. See Press Release, U.S. Treasury, supra note 10 (announcing the guaranty 
of money market funds by the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve). 
 39. See generally Karl S. Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulating Systemic 
Moral Hazard, 57 UCLA L. REV. 183 (2009). 
BIRDTHISTLE – FINAL  12/14/2010 2:22 PM 
2010:1155 Breaking Bucks 1163 
breaking of the buck in the Reserve Primary Fund and the broader 
external ramifications of that failure upon credit and capital markets in 
the United States. 
In Part II, I analyze the new rules and rationales adopted by the SEC 
in the wake of the financial crisis, particularly those amending maturity 
and liquidity requirements, perpetuating the reliance upon credit rating 
agencies, and retaining the use of a fixed NAV in money market funds. 
Specifically, I examine the degree to which these rules will—or will 
not—effectively address the recent internal problems for investors in 
money market funds and the external problems of future credit crises for 
corporate borrowers from money market funds. 
In Part III, I propose and critique an array of possible solutions 
intended to address specific issues within money market funds as well as 
their broader economic impact, including the return to a floating NAV, 
the use of a dual-tier investment structure for retail and institutional 
investors, and the establishment of some system of obligatory public, 
mutual, or private deposit insurance. 
I. THE GROWTH AND REGULATION OF MONEY MARKET FUNDS 
In four short decades, the assets managed by money market funds in 
the United States have soared from zero cents to more than three trillion 
dollars.40 Today nearly thirty cents of every dollar that Americans invest 
in mutual funds flow into a money market fund.41 The story of this 
astonishing success turns on two critical developments involving 
regulatory interventions: one that limited the investment returns of the 
greatest competitor of money market funds, viz. bank savings accounts; 
and another that liberated money market funds to emulate the appearance 
of those bank savings accounts.42 As soon as investors believed that they 
could receive higher performance without sacrificing safety, they 
redirected huge amounts of their savings away from bank accounts and 
into money market funds.43 But when the financial crisis of 2008 
exposed the structural vulnerabilities of money market funds and 
reminded the market that these funds are, in fact, far riskier than bank 
accounts, investors immediately redeemed hundreds of billions of 
dollars.44
 
 40. See ICI FACT BOOK, supra note 3, at 160 tbl.37. 
 Thus the remarkable success—and recent suspicion—of money 
 41. See id. at 22, 23 fig.2.1. 
 42. See generally Daniel E. Levin, Breaking the Buck: The End for Money 
Market Mutual Funds as We Know Them, 28 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 747 (2009). 
 43. See TAMAR FRANKEL & CLIFFORD E. KIRSCH, INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT 
REGULATION 463–64 (3d ed. 2005). 
 44. See Diana B. Henriques, The Buck Broke. So How To Retool Money 
Funds?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2009, at BU13. 
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market funds has long been closely entwined with their regulatory and 
economic structure.45
A. Mutual Funds and Floating NAVs 
 
Less than forty years ago, a privately held investment advisory 
company named The Reserve brought to market a new mutual fund 
called the Reserve Fund.46 The investment strategy of this novel 
investment—the nation’s first money market fund—concentrated on the 
extremely conservative end of the investing spectrum: the fund invested 
only in securities offered by the United States government or the largest 
and safest corporate issuers, and only in those securities that offered very 
short-term maturities. For investors who wished to avoid the perils of 
equity investments and longer-term debt offerings or the unpredictability 
of a volatile stock market, a fund such as this could serve as a relatively 
safe haven while still providing positive, albeit modest returns. This 
simple idea would win almost universal appeal amongst both retail and 
institutional investors, as soon as money market funds could modify their 
pricing mechanism.47
As do all mutual funds and indeed most collective investment 
vehicles, a money market fund gathers assets by persuading investors to 
invest cash in the fund through the purchase of shares in the fund. The 
fund’s investment advisor then uses this collective pool of cash to 
assemble an investment portfolio by purchasing securities offered by 
other companies or governments. To the extent the advisor makes wise 
investment decisions, the fund’s portfolio will grow in value and thus 
generate a beneficial return for all the fund’s shareholders.
 
48
 
 45. For an excellent overview of the financial literature studying the economic 
dynamics and performance of money market funds over the past four decades, see 
Baklanova, supra note 23 (surveying “studies related to funds’ investment management 
practices”). 
 Although an 
investor could, of course, bypass the services of a fund and its advisor by 
directly acquiring a similar portfolio of underlying securities, millions of 
American individuals and institutions choose to pay funds—or, more 
 46. FINK, supra note 9, at 80–81; see also Revisions to Rules Regulating 
Money Market Funds, 55 Fed. Reg. 30,239 (Jul. 25, 1990) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. 
230, 239, 270, 274). 
 47. See Timothy Q. Cook & Jeremy G. Duffield, Money Market Mutual Funds 
and Other Short-Term Investment Pools, in INSTRUMENTS OF THE MONEY MARKET 156, 
164–65 (Timothy Q. Cook & Robert K. Laroche eds., 7th ed. 1993). 
 48. Note that any growth in assets under management that accrue merely as a 
function of new investors joining a fund does not increase returns to existing 
shareholders. Indeed, this phenomenon generally benefits only the fund sponsor. See 
Birdthistle, supra note 24, at 1425–26. 
BIRDTHISTLE – FINAL  12/14/2010 2:22 PM 
2010:1155 Breaking Bucks 1165 
precisely, those funds’ advisors—billions of dollars each year49 to serve 
as intermediaries to manage twelve trillion dollars in mutual fund 
holdings.50 In return, these investors gain access to the advisors’ 
investment expertise, instant financial diversification, and the ready 
ability to redeem their investments for cash.51
1. MARK-TO-MARKET ACCOUNTING 
 
The Investment Company Act of 1940 52 and rules promulgated 
thereunder by the SEC 53 govern the general operation of money market 
funds and, indeed, all registered investment companies (as mutual funds 
are statutorily defined).54 This body of law provides specific guidance on 
the accounting method that advisors must use for calculating the price 
that every shareholder pays for his or her shares in a mutual fund, known 
as the fund’s net asset value (NAV). The standard accounting system for 
mutual funds—set forth in § 2(a)(41) of the Company Act55 in 
conjunction with rules 2a-456 and 22c-157—is known as “mark-to-market 
accounting.”58 Mark-to-market accounting requires that the value of a 
mutual fund’s portfolio reflect the regular fluctuations in the value of a 
fund’s underlying securities, thereby causing the fund’s NAV also to 
oscillate—or to float.59
Specifically, mark-to-market accounting requires that a fund’s 
advisor value the fund’s portfolio securities using market quotations 
when the fund’s NAV is calculated at the close of business each day.
 
60
 
 49. See Baklanova, supra note 23, at 5 n.6 (discussing the array and magnitude 
of fees associated with the management and operation of money market funds). 
 
 50. See ICI FACT BOOK, supra note 3, at 200 n.2 (reporting total mutual fund 
assets under management of more than $12 trillion in 2009). 
 51. Worldwide holdings in money market funds reached a peak of $5.7 trillion 
in 2009. See INV. CO. INST., WORLDWIDE MUTUAL FUND ASSETS AND FLOWS 
SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES, SECOND QUARTER 2009 tbl.S4 (Oct. 29, 2009).  
 52. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80(a)-51 (2006). 
 53. 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.2a-7, 270.22c-1 (2010). 
 54. More specifically, money market funds are “open-end management 
investment companies that are registered under the Investment Company Act and 
regulated under rule 2a-7 under the Act.” Money Market Fund Reform Proposed Rule, 74 
Fed. Reg. 32,688, 32,688 (July 8, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 274). 
 55. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(41). 
 56. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7. 
 57. § 270.22c-1. 
 58. See Money Market Fund Reform Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 32,690 
(describing the rules and requirements for using the “mark-to-market” accounting 
method). 
 59. See id. 
 60. William A. Birdthistle, The Fortunes and Foibles of Exchange-Traded 
Funds: A Positive Market Response to the Problems of Mutual Funds, 33 DEL. J. CORP. 
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To illustrate a simple example, picture a fund whose entire portfolio 
consists only of shares in ExxonMobil. At the close of business, the 
advisor would multiply the closing value of the ExxonMobil share price 
by the number of the fund’s ExxonMobil shares to determine the value of 
the fund’s portfolio holdings. For fund investments that trade on public 
exchanges, such a computation is easily and instantaneously made.61
With securities for which no market quotation is readily available—
such as illiquid investments in private companies, foreign markets, or 
other rarely traded sectors—the valuation process is somewhat more 
complicated. The fund’s board of trustees must make a good faith 
determination of the portfolio securities’ fair value, which it typically 
does in consultation with a third-party vendor that specializes in valuing 
such illiquid investments.
 
62
The goal of the mark-to-market accounting system is to compute an 
accurate and timely value of the fund’s portfolio.
 
63 If a fund fails to 
update the value of an outdated and illiquid holding, it will under or (as 
is more likely, given the financial incentives) overvalue the total worth of 
its portfolio. Because advisors are compensated via fees calculated as a 
percentage of fund assets under their management, fund investors will 
overpay if a fund’s portfolio is inaccurately overvalued. A classic 
example of this kind of problem with fair valuation involves a fund’s 
investment in a private company—for whose stock there is no publicly 
traded price or regular valuation event—which has lost much of its value 
but has not been updated in the fund’s overall NAV calculation. 
Consider, for instance, a start-up venture whose stock costs $50 dollars 
per share on January 1. If, one month later, the company were sued very 
credibly for patent infringement, the value of the company’s stock would 
almost certainly drop well below $50 per share, even if no publicly 
traded market reflected that decline. If mutual funds investing in that 
company did not lower the value of their investments accordingly, they 
would in effect be overcharging their fund shareholders.64
 
L. 69, 86–87 (2008) [hereinafter Birdthistle, Fortunes and Foibles] (describing the use of 
“forward pricing” in mutual funds, which results in the calculation of a price only once a 
day, rather than constantly as with an exchange-traded financial product). 
 Mark-to-
market accounting attempts to ensure that mutual funds are regularly 
 61. See id. 
 62. Id. at 103–04 (analyzing situations in which funds have engaged in unfair 
valuations of their portfolios). 
 63. See Money Market Fund Reform Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 32,690. 
 64. See Stephen Choi & Marcel Kahan, The Market Penalty for Mutual Fund 
Scandals, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1021 (2007) (analyzing investor flows related to claims of 
market-timing and other alleged malfeasance in mutual funds). 
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reporting the most accurate valuation of their portfolios, primarily to 
protect the fees that fund shareholders pay.65
In addition to holdings that are difficult to value, the calculation of 
NAV also must include other, simpler computations. A fund’s cash 
holdings, for instance, must also be counted, in addition to liabilities such 
as administrative expenses, legal fees, and the investment advisory fee, 
which must be subtracted. When the grand total is determined, that 
amount is then divided by the total number of shares outstanding to 
calculate a price per each fund share.
 
66
In the first few years of their existence, money market funds such as 
the Reserve Primary Fund used this mark-to-market accounting system 
and, accordingly, came with what is known as a floating NAV.
 
67
2. THE CONSEQUENCES OF REDEMPTION 
 
The pricing mechanism of mutual funds is relevant not only when 
investors buy fund shares but even more when they choose to sell them. 
Importantly, the fact that mutual fund NAVs float makes these funds, by 
definition, immune from that most devastating problem in the universe of 
financial withdrawals: runs on the bank.68 The disposition of mutual fund 
shares is unique in the capital markets because all mutual fund 
shareholders—including money market investors—redeem, rather than 
trade, their shares.69 That is to say, when a shareholder elects to exit a 
fund, he does not trade his shares on a stock exchange to some other 
willing investor. Instead, the shareholder puts the shares back into the 
mutual fund directly, which then pays the investor whatever the price of 
the NAV happens to be at the close of business that day. This redemption 
mechanism is not simply a technical trivium; it has enormous 
consequences for the entire governance and operational dynamics of 
mutual funds.70
By way of contrast, consider that shares in ordinary operating 
companies trade between investors on a secondary stock exchange. Thus 
each of those investors buys or sells corporate shares for whatever price 
the market of supply and demand produces. None of these investors is 
 
 
 65. See Birdthistle, Fortunes and Foibles, supra note 60, at 103–04. 
 66. See FRANKEL & KIRSCH, supra note 43, at 302. 
 67. See Money Market Fund Reform Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 32,716–
17; see also Dale L. Domian & William Reichenstein, Performance and Persistence in 
Money Market Fund Returns, 6 FIN. SERVS. REV. 169, 171–72 (1997). 
 68. See generally Presentment of Check During Run on Bank, 49 BANKING L.J. 
173 (John Edson Brady ed., 1932) (reviewing legal principles of liability attaching to 
various parties in the event of a run on the bank). 
 69. See Birdthistle, Fortunes and Foibles, supra note 60, at 90. 
 70. See ICI FACT BOOK, supra note 3, at 42–44. 
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guaranteed access to their actual monetary investment in the corporation. 
Ordinary corporations, unlike mutual funds, accordingly feature what is 
known as “capital lock-in.”71 Once early investors commit their 
investment to the corporation through an initial public offering or other 
stock offering, the only ways in which capital may subsequently flow out 
of the corporation back to its investors are through dividends—which are 
authorized by the board of directors, not the shareholders—or 
liquidations upon the bankruptcy or dissolution of a corporation.72 What 
subsequent buyers of these shares are willing to pay thus turns largely 
upon what they believe the future prospects of a corporation are and how 
those prospects affect the net present value of shares today.73 These 
trading dynamics, when coupled with the ability to sell corporate shares 
short and to separate economic and voting rights of shares, contribute to 
the creation of a market for corporate control with control premia in 
typical corporations.74 Redemption at NAV in mutual funds, by contrast, 
virtually eliminates such governance mechanisms in those funds.75
But in both corporations and mutual funds (and, formerly, money 
market funds), the fact that their share prices or NAVs float immediately 
places all investors on notice that the value of their investment can also 
rise or fall.
 
76 Indeed, each trading day of the year, the value of their 
investment almost certainly will rise or fall, either a few basis points or 
even multiple percentage points.77
 
 71. See generally Lynn Stout, On the Nature of Corporations, 2005 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 253 (describing and discussing “capital lock-in”). 
 Thus the risk of loss—indeed, even of 
total loss—is a real and omnipresent feature of these investments, 
engineered into their most salient feature: their price. 
 72. See id. at 255–58. 
 73. See id. at 265; Levin, supra note 42, at 749. 
 74. See Anupam Chandar, Corporate Law’s Distributive Design, 118 YALE L.J. 
POCKET PART 82 (2008), http://thepocketpart.org/2008/10/28/ 
chanderresponse.html. 
 75. See John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why 
Governance and Fee Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual Funds, YALE L.J. (forthcoming 
2010), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1547162 (arguing that redemption 
eliminates the need for and efficacy of other standard corporate governance mechanisms 
in mutual funds). 
 76. See Press Release, President’s Working Grp. on Fin. Mkts., Money Market 
Fund Reform Options 19–23 (Oct. 2010) (“By making gains and losses a regular 
occurrence, as they are in other mutual funds, a floating NAV could alter investor 
expectations and make clear that MMFs are not risk-free vehicles.”). 
 77. See id. 
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3. THE PHENOMENON OF RUNS 
Because of their floating prices, however, one risk that was not 
historically present in either corporate or mutual fund investments was 
that of a run. A run on a financial institution requires, as a prerequisite, 
some sort of promise by the institution of a guaranteed return to its 
counterparties.78 A run then occurs when counterparties of the promising 
institution fear that the institution no longer holds assets sufficient to 
fulfill all of its obligations.79 In such a circumstance, the first parties to 
divest from the institution are the most likely to receive their entire 
deposit, while laggards may receive nothing at all.80 The dynamics of 
this situation thus encourage counterparties to rush with as much haste as 
possible to withdraw their monies before the institution runs completely 
dry.81 In a mutual fund, such a phenomenon is structurally impossible, 
because the fund never makes the initial promise to pay out anything 
more than each share’s pro rata portion of the fund’s total assets.82
If a fund’s NAV were to drop by 10 percent overnight, for example, 
the consequences would be identical whether one investor redeemed or 
every investor redeemed. Each investor in the fund would receive 90 
percent of the original value. In an institution that guaranteed full 
payment, however, the dynamics would be quite different. The first 90 
percent of investors to withdraw would receive 100 percent of their 
deposits, while the last 10 percent would receive nothing. Not wishing to 
be one of the latter, every investor with time and knowledge will hurry to 
be one of the former, exacerbating the velocity of the run.
 
83
 
 78. See Charles K. Whitehead, Reframing Financial Regulation, 90 B.U. L. 
REV. 1, 21–25 (2010) (stating that “the drop below one dollar per share” in the Reserve’s 
breaking of the buck “raised the same concerns that spark a bank run – a loss of 
confidence over financial stability, fueled by uncertainty over the value of the [money 
market fund’s] assets, causing widespread redemptions across the industry”); Richard 
McAdams, Beyond the Prisoner’s Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory, and Law, 82 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 209, 216 (2009) (discussing whether “[b]ank runs represent a classic 
prisoner’s dilemma”). 
 When money 
market funds used to operate with floating NAVs, such runs were neither 
possible nor appeared to be so because investors could readily appreciate 
the fact that they were guaranteed nothing more than their portion of the 
fund’s inconstant total. Once money market funds adopted fixed NAVs, 
however, money market investors could then misconstrue the constant 
price—$1.00 per share—as an implicit guarantee that their investment 
was steadfast. And thus with a switch from floating to fixed pricing was 
 79. Whitehead, supra note 78, at 21. 
 80. Id. at 13. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See FRANKEL & KIRSCH, supra note 43, at 301–02. 
 83. See McAdams, supra note 78, at 216–17. 
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laid the foundation of the massive run on money market funds that 
occurred during the 2008 financial crisis.84
B. Regulation Q and Limits on Interest in Bank Accounts 
 
Bank accounts are perhaps the archetypical example of a financial 
instrument with a fixed obligation. Unlike corporate securities and 
typical fund investments, bank accounts guarantee deposits with returns 
certain.85
1. GUARANTEED RETURNS, RATINGS AND INSURANCE 
 For investors seeking safety, banks are often the option of first 
resort. Of course, most investors would wish, in addition to that 
downside protection, for their deposits at least to keep pace with inflation 
and not merely to remain static over time. To that end, banks offer 
savings accounts that guarantee more than just the safety of deposits. 
Although the dangers of banks promising more interest than they can 
deliver are easy to imagine, the original sin of banks vis-à-vis money 
market funds was quite the opposite: their failure to promise enough. 
Banks offer certainty to their depositors through contractual 
guarantees to repay, not by merely chancing their pricing process to 
market performance.86 As long as a bank remains solvent, the bank is 
contractually obliged to make all of its depositors whole. Poor 
performance in the market generally, or of the bank’s investments 
specifically, has no legal bearing on the bank’s obligations to its 
depositors.87
How then might a bank fulfill its promise to honor deposits? There 
are two principal ways. The easiest would be for the bank simply to leave 
the depositors’ money intact in a vault and not to touch it at all. All funds 
would then be waiting for depositors whenever they wished to withdraw 
them. Of course, such a system is far from how banks operate. Instead, 
banks attempt to put their depositors’ funds to work by lending or 
investing the money in search of a positive return. To the extent a bank 
makes a successful return on those investments—which can be done 
through very conservative and comparatively safe investments—the bank 
can both preserve the integrity of its account-holders’ deposits while also 
making a profit for itself. Indeed, in savings accounts, banks will go 
 
 
 84. See Henriques, supra note 44, at BU 13. 
 85. See Levin, supra note 42, at 750 (“The contractual terms of the deposit 
agreement, not market factors, govern the obligation of the bank to pay the depositor her 
principal.”). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
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further by promising not simply to return 100 percent of deposits but to 
supplement that amount by an additional rate of modest interest. 
Of course, the greater the magnitude of return a bank promises its 
depositors, the riskier its use of the depositors’ funds may become.88 To 
generate modest returns, a bank might lend funds only to lenders with 
outstanding credit scores, large equity cushions, and strong collateral 
guarantees. This sort of lending is precisely what occurs when a bank 
“buys” or “invests” in a Treasury bill—the bank is lending its depositors’ 
money to the U.S. government, the institution with the strongest credit 
and collateral in the world, at the moment.89 Of course, the safer and 
stronger the borrower, the less the borrower will pay to borrow money, 
so the return on Treasury bills is comparatively low. To increase returns, 
a bank could lend to large private institutions such as publicly traded 
corporations, which do not wield the full faith and credit of a sovereign 
power, but have historically boasted of excellent credit-worthiness.90 
Because these corporations do not have the supporting resources of the 
U.S. government, they must entice lenders by offering higher rates of 
interest. For banks seeking a return, the trade-off between risk and return 
is clear. As they seek increasingly higher interest rates for their 
depositors, or higher profits for themselves, they must lend funds to 
borrowers with ever-higher risks.91
Assessing the risk of borrowers is thus a primary concern of the 
credit markets.
 
92 A bank might perform extensive due diligence on each 
potential counterparty to assess its credit risk, but such a process would 
be expensive, time-consuming, and duplicative. Instead, institutions 
called Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations 
(NRSROs)93—better known as credit ratings agencies, such as Standard 
& Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch94—serve as informational intermediaries 
by evaluating the creditworthiness of most major borrowers in the 
markets and assigning them grades that are readily interpreted by a wide 
universe of potential lenders.95
 
 88. See generally NOCERA, supra note 18 (discussing how middle class 
investors became more willing to acquire debt and accept risk through their growing 
participation in stocks, mutual funds, and money market accounts). 
 A bank, and indeed any lender, can thus 
 89. See id. at 77–80. 
 90. See FINK, supra note 9. 
 91. See Levin, supra note 42, at 763–65.  
 92. See generally Niall Ferguson, Remarks at the Carnegie Council Global 
Ethics Forum: The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World (Nov. 20, 2008), 
available at http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/video/data/000094. 
 93. See Money Market Reform Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,688, 32,724 
(July 8, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 274). 
 94. See Partnoy, supra note 36, at 639. 
 95. Id. at 621–22. 
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conform the degree of risk and reward it is willing to pursue by lending 
only to institutions with certain credit ratings.96 Extremely conservative 
institutions highly concerned with the safety of their investments, such as 
banks, might permit loans only to governments or corporate issuers with 
the highest ratings.97
Notwithstanding a conservative investment approach marked by 
scrupulous reliance upon independent ratings, a bank’s loan may still fail 
of course. If a borrower defaults or goes bankrupt, the bank’s loan is 
likely to become worthless quickly. The bank may then hold insufficient 
assets to honor contractual guarantees to its own depositors. As we have 
seen, these are the circumstances that very easily may spark a run on the 
bank.
 
98
Because of this risk—and hard-learned experience—bank accounts 
are now insured against loss by the FDIC, an independent government 
agency created by the U.S. Congress to “maintain stability and public 
confidence in the nation’s financial system[] by insuring deposits [in 
banks].”
 
99 The FDIC insures each depositor up to at least $250,000 per 
institution.100 Not only does this facility reimburse significant potential 
losses, its presence forestalls runs on banks.101 Because deposits are 
guaranteed, individual depositors have no need or incentive to sprint to 
withdraw their funds in the event of a bank failure. The FDIC has 
worked remarkably well at both preserving deposits and preventing 
runs.102
2. THE RISE AND DEMISE OF REGULATION Q 
 Of course, no insurance comes without a premium, and every 
penny paid to insure a bank account comes directly out of the potential 
interest returns on that account. 
But deposit insurance has not been the only source of friction to 
drag the returns of bank accounts lower than comparable investments 
free from insurance and its premia. The most important historical 
limitation on the interest rates of bank accounts was a regulatory 
 
 96. See id. at 629–30. 
 97. Id. at 622 n.12 
 98. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 199 (2008) 
(describing bank runs and their dynamics as classic examples of systemic risk).  
 99. FDIC Mission, Vision, and Values, FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE 
CORPORATION, http://www.fdic.gov/about/mission/index.html. 
 100.  Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Basic FDIC Insurance Coverage 
Permanently Increased to $250,000 Per Depositor (Jul. 21, 2010), 
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2010/pr10161.html.  
 101. See id. 
 102. See Schwarcz, supra note 98, at 211 (noting the salutary effects of the 
creation of the FDIC). 
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restriction: Regulation Q.103 For more than half a century, from 1933 
until 1986, Regulation Q imposed a ceiling on the rates that banks could 
pay on savings deposits.104
Through the Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935, Congress enacted 
Regulation Q to authorize the Federal Reserve to set the permissible rates 
of interest that banks would be allowed to pay their customers.
 
105 These 
price ceilings had multiple purposes: “[T]o encourage country banks to 
lend more in their local communities rather than hold balances with 
larger banks in financial centers,”106 to improve liquidity in the banking 
system; and “to increase bank profits by limiting the competition for 
deposits” because “competition for deposits not only reduced bank 
profits by raising interest expenses, but also might cause banks to acquire 
riskier assets with higher expected returns in attempts to limit the erosion 
of their profits.”107
In the 1970s, policymakers wielded Regulation Q to impose ceiling 
rates that rested below market rates of interest, a decision with quick and 
powerful consequences.
 
108 Throughout the late 1960s and all of the 
1970s, the ceiling rate under Regulation Q never rose above 6 percent. 
During the same period, however, the three-month Treasury bill offered 
interest rates almost always significantly higher, even spiking above 14 
percent at times.109 Investors seeking returns could obviously do far 
better by investing their money outside rather than inside bank 
accounts.110 Predictably, investors eagerly sought out investment 
vehicles that were not restricted by Regulation Q’s limits on interest.111
C. Money Market Funds and Fixed NAVs 
 
The newly introduced Primary Reserve Fund and its ilk were just such 
investments. 
As we have seen, money market funds in their earliest 
incarnations—like all other mutual funds—originally featured a floating 
 
 103. See generally Gilbert, supra note 31 (reviewing the history, administration, 
and goals of Regulation Q). 
 104. See id. at 22. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 23. 
 108. See Joseph A. DiNuzzo, The Depository Institutions Deregulation 
Committee: Did It Achieve the Goal?, 101 BANKING L.J. 100, 100–01 (1984). 
 109. See Gilbert, supra note 31, at 29 fig.3. 
 110. See Kenneth T. Rosen & Larry Katz, Money Market Mutual Funds: An 
Experiment in Ad Hoc Deregulation, 36 J. FIN. 1011, 1011, 1015 (1983). 
 111. See Gilbert, supra note 31, at 29–30. 
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NAV that differed markedly from the fixed return of bank accounts.112 
But throughout the 1970s, sponsors of mutual funds petitioned the SEC 
for, and received, exemptions to use an alternative to the mark-to-market 
accounting technique.113 By using a method known as amortized-cost 
accounting,114 money market funds could maintain a stable NAV that 
looks much more like the valuation of a bank deposit, thus dramatically 
closing the gap in appearances between the two instruments. This pricing 
change occurred just as Regulation Q was artificially suppressing bank 
interest rates far lower than market interest rates. Thus by looking like a 
bank account, yet offering far higher yields, money market funds became 
tremendously popular.115
1. AMORTIZED-COST ACCOUNTING 
 
In its June 2009 release proposing new regulations for money 
market funds, the SEC describes the operation and consequences of 
amortized-cost method of valuation as follows: 
 
Under the amortized cost method, portfolio securities are valued 
at cost plus any amortization of premium or accumulation of 
discount (“amortized cost”). The basic premise underlying 
money market funds’ use of the amortized cost method of 
valuation is that high-quality, short-term debt securities held 
until maturity will eventually return to the amortized cost value, 
regardless of any current disparity between the amortized cost 
value and market value, and would not ordinarily be expected to 
fluctuate significantly in value.116
 
 
In exchange for promising to invest only in “high-quality, short-term 
debt securities,”117 the SEC permitted money market funds to use this 
method of accounting. Indeed, after numerous fund sponsors made 
identical petitions and promises, the SEC amended Rule 2a-7 to permit 
all money market funds to use this method.118
 
 112. See supra text accompanying notes 24–25. 
 As a consequence, all 
money market funds gained the ability to maintain a stable NAV of 
 113. See supra text accompanying notes 25–27. 
 114. See Money Market Fund Reform Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,688, 
32,688 (July 8, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 274). 
 115. See Gilbert, supra note 30, at 31, 32–33; Levin, supra note 42, at 752–53. 
 116. Money Market Fund Reform Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 32,690. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See id. 
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$1.00 per share.119 In effect, they now look extremely similar to bank 
accounts with guaranteed returns.120
The similarity to bank accounts was heightened by money market 
funds’ adoption of several additional bank-like features. First, money 
market funds adopted a penny-rounding method of pricing, in which “the 
current net asset value per share is rounded to the nearest one percent” 
when calculating NAV for the “purposes of distribution, redemption and 
repurchase.”
 
121 Once the price of money market funds was thus 
stabilized, other features that rely upon pricing predictability became 
common, such as “check-writing privileges, exchange privileges, and 
near-immediate liquidity.”122
Once money market funds began to enjoy early success, the 
resemblance to bank accounts was made complete with a misjudgment 
by banks themselves.
 
123 Witnessing their customers flee bank accounts 
for the higher returns of money market funds, banks fought back first by 
lobbying for the elimination of Regulation Q and then by offering 
something they called “money market deposit accounts.”124 The name of 
this novel product was simply a marketing tactic, albeit a poor one. This 
kind of new bank account had no “relationship to the money market 
other than via the name of its nemesis, the money market mutual 
fund.”125 Instead, it was simply “a deposit account product designed to 
make consumers believe that it was the same as the money market 
mutual funds that those consumers had come to love.”126 But increasing 
the level of confusion did not help banks—money market funds 
continued to grow, and investors increasingly came to assume they 
possessed bank-like security.127
 
 119. See id. at 32,688, 32,690. 
 Indeed, with the two similarly named 
instruments now competing head-to-head, the money market mutual 
funds would prevail because they did not carry insurance and thus did 
not deduct insurance premia from their returns. Compared to an FDIC-
insured instrument, like money market deposit accounts, they would 
always bring greater returns—as well as greater risk. 
 120. See, e.g., Richard A. Booth, Things Happen, 55 VILL. L. REV. 57, 64 (2010) 
(“Consumers developed unrealistic expectations about money market funds (MMFs). 
Consumers came to assume that MMFs were equivalent to an insured checking account 
that paid interest.”). 
 121. Money Market Fund Reform Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 32,690 n.23. 
 122. Id. at 32688. 
 123. See Levin, supra note 42, at 753–54. 
 124. Id. at 752–53, 756. 
 125. Id. at 756. 
 126. Id. at 757. 
 127. See ICI FACT BOOK, supra note 3, at 160 tbl.37. 
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2. THE GROWTH OF MONEY MARKET FUNDS 
The fact that money market funds quickly took on the appearance of 
bank accounts, while offering far higher rates of return—because they 
were not restricted by Regulation Q and not subject to insurance 
premia—triggered tremendous growth in these investments.128 From 
1970, when they contained no money whatsoever, until their peak in 
2008, money market funds accumulated almost $4 trillion in assets under 
management.129 During that time, they grew from zero funds to more 
than one thousand at their peak in 1999.130
Currently, more than seven hundred and fifty money market funds 
are registered with the SEC. In aggregate, they hold more than $3.2 
trillion, which represents approximately 30 percent of all assets invested 
in the entire mutual fund industry.
 
131 The money market field has also 
specialized to a significant degree, and now features prime funds, 
government funds, and tax-exempt funds.132 Prime funds typically hold 
an assortment of “taxable short-term obligations issued by corporations 
and banks, as well as repurchase agreements and asset backed 
commercial paper secured by pools of assets.”133 Government funds 
“principally hold obligations of the U.S. Government, including 
obligations of the U.S. Treasury and federal agencies and 
instrumentalities, as well as repurchase agreements collateralized by 
Government securities.”134 Investing in the private sector is generally 
considered riskier than investing in government securities, so prime 
funds usually offer a higher rate of return, while government funds offer 
greater safety. Tax-exempt funds “primarily hold obligations of state and 
local governments and their instrumentalities, and pay interest that is 
generally exempt from federal income taxes.”135
Perhaps the major development of money market funds in recent 
years concerns the nature of the shareholders who purchase shares in the 
funds. Initially, money market funds sought investment from individuals. 
Today, institutional investors—such as corporations, hedge funds, 
pension funds, and governmental entities—use money market funds to 
 
 
 128. See id. 
 129. See id. at 126 tbl.3. 
 130. See id. at 128 tbl.5. 
 131. See id. at 22, 126; Money Market Fund Reform Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. 
Reg. 32,688, 32,688–89 (July 8, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 274). 
 132. See Money Market Fund Reform Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 32,689. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
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“outsource[]” their cash management operations.136 Institutional 
investors now own approximately 66 percent of assets in these funds.137
But the impact of money market funds is not confined simply to the 
internal dynamics of funds and their investors. This enormous investment 
pool also interacts importantly with the broader money and credit 
markets, in which money market funds use their $3 trillion to buy and 
sell short-term investments.
 
138 Those external affairs of money market 
funds played a significant role in the financial crisis of 2008.139
D. Breaking the Buck and Financial Crisis 
 
Stresses in the U.S. financial system that had built up throughout 
2008 reached a critical point in mid-September of that year when 
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. declared bankruptcy.140 The bankruptcy 
of Lehman Brothers caused the Reserve Primary Fund first to break its 
buck and then to experience a run by its shareholders.141 The Primary 
Fund held $63 billion in assets under management, of which it had 
invested $785 million—or more than 1.2 percent of its portfolio—in 
commercial paper issued by Lehman Brothers.142 When Lehman 
Brothers went bankrupt, the value of its commercial paper plummeted to 
zero. Thus, the Primary Fund instantly lost $785 million in value, which 
dropped its NAV per share from $1.00 to $0.97143 and thereby broke its 
buck.144
Although that loss may not appear substantial, when applied to large 
investment holdings, shareholders stood to lose hundreds of millions of 
dollars that they had assumed were rock solid. More importantly, the loss 
triggered a run on the fund that threatened to impose far greater losses on 
 
 
 136. Id. 
 137. See id. 
 138. See id. 
 139. See PAULSON, supra note 4, at 234–38. 
 140. See MCDONALD, supra note 8, at 324–25; Steven M. Davidoff & David 
Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 
ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 504–08 (2009) (noting the role of money market funds and the 
Reserve’s breaking of the buck in the cascade of events culminating in the financial crisis 
of 2008); Edward R. Morrison, Is the Bankruptcy Code an Adequate Mechanism for 
Resolving the Distress of Systemically Important Institutions?, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 449, 451 
(2009).  
 141. See Mamudi & Burton, supra note 2. 
 142. See id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See Mercer E. Bullard, Federally-Insured Money Market Funds and Narrow 
Banks: The Path of Least Insurance, (March 2, 2009) (unpublished article), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1351987 (“An [money market fund] is permitted to maintain a 
$1.00 per share NAV only as long as the per share market value of its holdings does not 
drop below $0.995.”).  
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the last investors remaining in the fund.145 When large institutional 
investors learned that the Primary Fund was writing down its Lehman 
holdings to zero, they immediately attempted to redeem their shares.146 If 
the Reserve honored its commitment to these shareholders, it would have 
had to pay the departing institutional investors $1.00 for every redeemed 
share. As each early investor left the fund with fully intact redemptions, 
the $785 million loss would grow into an ever-increasing percentage of 
loss for the stragglers. Just as in a classic bank run, the first depositors 
out the door might exit with their entire holdings until the bank’s 
reserves are exhausted, at which point remaining depositors would 
receive nothing.147 To avoid this outcome, smaller investors in the fund 
sued to enjoin all redemptions until a federal court could oversee an 
orderly liquidation of the entire fund on a pro rata basis.148
In addition to these internal dynamics among the money market 
fund, its sponsor, and its investors, the failure of the Primary Fund 
dramatically illustrated the interdependence between money market 
funds and the capital markets. When shareholders in the fund first 
demanded redemptions, the Primary Fund quickly paid out its available 
cash reserves to satisfy those requests.
 
149 Once all of the fund’s cash had 
been redeemed, the only way the fund could satisfy additional 
redemptions was to sell portfolio holdings.150
 
 145. See Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J. 
CORP. L. 469, 488–90 (2010). 
 Just like widespread 
While causality is difficult to establish, most observers believe that the fear 
resulting from the Lehman filing and the implications for Reserve Primary 
Fund spilled over into redemption requests at other money market funds, 
many of which had negligible exposure to Lehman. Systemic concerns were 
substantial, because many corporate borrowers rely on the commercial paper 
market to fund their short-term operations, and a run on money market funds 
takes needed capital out of this market. 
Id. at 489. 
 146. See Henriques, supra note 44. 
 147. See Press Release, President’s Working Grp. on Fin. Mkts., supra note 76, 
at 11–13 (discussing the run on the Reserve Primary Fund); Andrew B. Lyon, Money 
Market Funds and Shareholder Dilution, 39 J. FIN. 1011 (1984). 
 148. See Kara McGuire, Ameriprise Sues Managers of Troubled Money Fund, 
MINN. STAR-TRIB., Sept. 19, 2008, at D1, D2 (“With billions of dollars of client money at 
stake, Minneapolis broker-dealer Ameriprise Financial Inc. on Friday sued New York 
fund manager the Reserve Management Co., alleging it tipped off big institutional 
investors about its troubled money market fund, the Primary Fund, but not smaller 
investors.”); see also In the Matter of The Reserve Fund, Investment Company Act, 73 
Fed. Reg. 55,572, 55,572 (Sept. 25, 2008) (in which the SEC issued an order permitting 
the suspension of redemptions in certain Reserve funds to permit their orderly 
liquidation). 
 149. See Money Market Fund Reform Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,688, 
32,691 (July 8, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 274). 
 150. Id. 
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margin calls in a bear market, the fund’s rapid sale of its holdings further 
depressed the market valuations of those securities. As shareholders in 
other money market funds witnessed the collapse of Lehman Brothers’ 
commercial paper, the potential bankruptcy of similar financial 
borrowers, the run on the Primary Fund, and the downward pressure on 
prices by rapid liquidations in the credit markets, they too sought 
redemptions and thus precipitated runs on other money market funds.151
Of course, money market funds had suffered losses in their 
portfolios previously—the collapse of Lehman Brothers paper was 
dramatic but certainly not the first time an investment held by a money 
market fund had unexpectedly declined in value. Indeed, once 
previously—though only once—a money market fund had broken its 
buck.
 
152 But well over a dozen times previously, losses in a money 
market fund’s portfolio had threatened to break the buck.153 In each of 
those other cases, however, the investment advisor managing the fund 
had itself stepped in to prevent the buck from breaking.154 To do so, the 
advisor or one of its affiliates paid full price for whatever holding in the 
fund’s portfolio had fallen in value and threatened the integrity of the 
fund’s price.155 Thus, the fund was made whole, the advisor absorbed the 
loss, and the fund shareholders might never have known the difference. 
Of course, for an advisor to absorb these losses, it must have sufficient 
resources to do so. Many fund advisors are affiliates of major financial 
institutions, with large pools of capital at their disposal, and have proven 
capable of engineering these internal bailouts.156 The Reserve, however, 
is a much smaller and independently owned operation. And, in the case 
of its Lehman Brothers losses, it simply did not have the financial 
wherewithal to pump $785 million into the fund.157
Immediately after the Primary Fund broke its buck, investors 
redeemed approximately $300 billion from other prime funds.
 
158
 
 151. See id. at 32,691–92. 
 Bracing 
themselves for runs on their own funds, other advisors of money market 
 152. In 1994, the Community Bankers U.S. Government Fund became the first 
money market fund to break the buck, when its price per share fell four cents short of the 
$1.00 level. See Mamudi & Burton, supra note 2. 
 153. Id.  
 154. See Bullard, supra note 144, at 10 (“On occasions when [money market 
funds’] share values have declined below or have come close to declining below $0.995, 
their sponsors have purchased the impaired portfolio securities at their face value, 
injected cash into the fund, or taken other steps to prevent the fund’s price from dropping 
below $1.00 per share.”). 
 155. See Money Market Fund Reform Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 32,690–
91. 
 156. See id. 
 157. See id. at 32,691. 
 158. See id. at 32,691–92. 
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funds retained their cash positions rather than continue to invest as 
normal in money market securities.159 With this complete cessation of 
new investment in short-term debt instruments, the money market 
consequently “seized up” and thus “impair[ed] access to credit in short-
term private debt markets.”160
To halt the spread of this credit debacle across the broader economy, 
the U.S. government announced massive and immediate measures. On 
September 19, 2008, the Treasury and the Federal Reserve announced a 
Temporary Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds, “an 
unprecedented market intervention by the federal government in order to 
stabilize and provide liquidity to the short-term markets”
 That is to say, the nation’s large operating 
companies immediately lost access to huge sources of loans that they 
used continually to manage their daily operations. 
161 by insuring 
each of the country’s money market funds against losses of up to $50 
billion per fund.162
Soporific money market funds no longer bored their investors into a 
sound sleep, as the head of the Reserve, Bruce Bent, had previously 
suggested.
 
163
II. A CRITIQUE OF THE NEW REGULATIONS AND RATIONALES 
 On the contrary, their failures had precipitated a potentially 
calamitous failure of the U.S. economy and triggered massive and 
unprecedented government intervention. 
Almost a year and a half after the breaking of the Primary Fund’s 
buck and its collateral damage, the SEC finalized new rules that attempt 
to grapple with the failures of money market funds.164 While the Federal 
Reserve and the Treasury Department wielded both the monies and the 
authority to play a more immediate and prominent role in addressing the 
financial crisis, the SEC’s reaction to those events is only now becoming 
clear through its more deliberate regulatory response. But the SEC’s new 
revisions to Rule 2a-7—which tinker with permissible portfolio holdings, 
perpetuate the use of discredited ratings agencies, and cling to the fixed 
NAV165
 
 159. See id. at 32,692. 
—are a deeply disappointing response to money market funds 
specifically. As a portent of the SEC’s broad swath of future rulemaking 
 160. Id.  
 161. Id. 
 162. Diana B. Henriques, Rescue Plan for Funds Will Come at a Price, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 20, 2008, at C1. 
 163. See Norris, supra note 1. 
 164. See Money Market Fund Reform Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 10,060, 10,060 
(Mar. 4, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 274). 
 165. See id. at 10,060–63. 
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under the Dodd-Frank legislation in response to the financial crisis,166
The SEC’s new approach exhibits a conception of financial 
regulation remarkably inconsistent with widely accepted economic and 
legal theory. While neoclassical economic theory counsels regulators to 
remain detached as to the merit of specific investments,
 
these money market rules are particularly troubling. 
167 and behavioral 
theory permits the privileging of certain, socially optimal investments,168
In conducting a post-mortem of the dynamics of money market 
funds during the recent crisis, analysts and regulators must identify the 
most salient defect and then the most relevant solutions. The most 
important failure of the Reserve Fund was not the unfortunate roiling of 
its internal shareholders by a run on the fund but, instead, the widespread 
and deleterious external effects on the credit and capital markets. After 
all, the particular investors of the Reserve Fund, after the orderly judicial 
liquidation of the fund, ultimately lost only one cent on the dollar.
 
the SEC has chosen an altogether different path. The SEC has instead 
extended a policy of providing a regulatory subsidy to one specific 
investment vehicle, money market funds, at the expense of others. That 
is, rather than establishing a neutral ground on which bank deposits, 
short-term bond funds, and other investment vehicles compete evenly 
against one another, the SEC has picked a winner by tilting the field 
towards money market funds, which have just demonstrated their 
profound weaknesses and vulnerability. 
169 As 
Professor Richard Booth states, “it is arguable that breaking the buck is 
no big deal. Plenty of depositors would have taken some risk for a little 
return on their checking accounts.”170
 
 166. See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 But the effects of money market 
malfunction on the broader marketplace were far more serious, both in 
terms of the billions of dollars required to forestall them and the millions 
of companies and citizens stymied by the resulting loss of credit. Yet the 
regulations passed by the SEC do not appear to target these more 
worrisome systemic vulnerabilities. 
 167. See generally POSNER, supra note 15. 
 168. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING 
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 104 (2008). 
 169. See S.E.C. Plan to Distribute Money Fund Is Accepted, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
25, 2009, at B3 (“The estimated $3.5 billion remaining assets of the Reserve Primary 
Fund should be distributed on a prorated basis to shareholders, a federal judge ruled on 
Wednesday in response to lawsuits filed after the fund’s value dropped below $1 a share 
in September 2008. . . . In a ruling that largely accepts a distribution plan proposed by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, the judge said that regulators and the fund’s 
trustees estimated that investors would recover 99 cents a share if remaining assets were 
distributed pro rata.”). 
 170. Booth, supra note 120, at 65. 
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A. Shorter Maturity and Greater Liquidity 
The most serious technical deficiency of the SEC’s new rules is the 
agency’s mistaken view of the ways in which money market funds 
interact with the broader credit markets.171 This misapprehension is 
manifest in the SEC’s new requirements that the composition of 
portfolios in money market funds consist of investments of shorter 
maturity and greater liquidity.172 Generally speaking, investments with 
shorter maturity and greater liquidity carry less risk to the investors who 
hold them but, as Professor Gordon illuminates, the SEC’s new rules 
actually increase risk to the broader financial system.173 Inasmuch as 
investors in even the broken Reserve Fund lost only 1 percent of their 
holdings,174
In its revisions to Rule 2a-7, the SEC has reduced the average 
weighted maturity of permissible money market investments from ninety 
days to sixty days.
 the systemic effects of the broken buck are clearly far more 
important. 
175 Similarly, the weighted average life of these 
permissible investments is now limited to one hundred and twenty 
days.176 The SEC argues that these shorter time horizons decrease a 
fund’s exposure to interest-rate risk, decrease the amplification of credit 
and interest-rate spreads on a fund, and reduce liquidity risk because a 
greater percentage of a fund’s investments will mature on a daily or 
weekly basis.177
But, as Gordon argues, the SEC’s attempt to limit risks within 
money market funds “adds systemic risk to financial intermediation by 
heightening the pressure on short-term money markets,” a “flaw” that is 
“fundamental and requires a rethinking of the general [money market 
fund] framework.”
 While these arguments are relatively uncontroversial, 
they apply only to the internal dynamics of funds. That is, they are 
intended to protect money market funds from the dangers of their own 
portfolio investments. 
178
The premise of the SEC’s tightening of portfolio requirements in 
money market funds rests upon the SEC’s earlier decision to permit fixed 
NAVs. That is, in order to ensure that funds with fixed NAVs never 
 
 
 171. See Money Market Fund Reform Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 10,060, 10,099 
(Mar. 4, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 274). 
 172. See id. at 10,070–78. 
 173. See Letter from Jeffrey N. Gordon to Elizabeth M. Murphy, supra note 35, 
at 3. 
 174. See S.E.C. Plan to Distribute Money Fund is Accepted, supra note 169. 
 175. See Money Market Fund Reform Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 10,070. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Letter from Jeffrey N. Gordon to Elizabeth M. Murphy, supra note 35, at 2. 
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experience precipitous or dramatic declines in their portfolios—a step 
necessary to ensure that these funds do not experience runs like those in 
2008—the SEC has elected to place substantive constraints on the kinds 
of portfolio securities in which these funds may invest.179 And if short 
maturities are relatively riskless, the thinking appears to go, then even 
shorter maturities must be safer still. But the relatively minor 
improvement in the quantum of risk experienced by fund investors when 
the maturity is reduced from ninety to sixty days is vastly outweighed by 
the comparatively major increase in the systemic risk. As Gordon notes, 
“by shortening maturities the SEC proposal [now rule] will increase 
rather [than] reduce the fragility of these markets because it makes it 
easier for [money market funds] to ‘run’ at a time of financial 
distress.”180
Gordon’s argument becomes clearer when one considers the 
interests of counterparties to money market funds. Money market funds 
buy short-term debt—that is, they lend money to the issuers of that 
debt—from corporations who need funds to pay for daily operations such 
as payroll and trade vendors.
 
181 Any solvent corporation could, of course, 
choose not to borrow money for these mundane and predictable 
purposes. A large enterprise such as General Electric, for example, could 
simply ensure that it maintained a cash reserve large enough to cover 
daily or weekly expenditures. But in order to do so, General Electric 
would need to pay very close attention to its cash flow and, to avoid 
miscalculating, would need to include a conservative buffer of more cash 
than it ever actually needed.182 Devoting resources to the careful and 
conservative management of cash flow necessarily depletes resources 
that could be used to expand General Electric’s more profitable 
enterprises.183 Perhaps it cannot build a new and more efficient plant 
because those funds would deplete cash reserves too much, so the 
company persists with outdated facilities. If, instead, General Electric 
could simply borrow at short notice and little cost whatever funds it 
needed to cover daily outlays, and then repay those loans right away, the 
corporation could operate far more leanly and efficiently.184
 
 179. Money Market Fund Reform Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 10,070. 
 And, given 
the overall size and soundness of its operations, the creditworthy 
corporation could certainly obtain an extremely short-term loan for very 
 180. Letter from Jeffrey N. Gordon to Elizabeth M. Murphy, supra note 35, at 3. 
 181. See STIGUM & CRESCENZI, supra note 9, at 51–53. 
 182. See id. 
 183. See id. 
 184. See id. 
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low prices. This process, writ large, drives much of the money market in 
the United States.185
But now imagine the effect of the new SEC rules. If every money 
market fund reduces the average maturity of its holdings from ninety 
days to sixty days, borrowers such as General Electric will have, on 
average, that much less time to repay their loans. Normally, this 
abbreviated schedule should not be a problem for a company like 
General Electric. But at moments of great stress in the economy—such 
as we experienced recently—many corporations may experience cash-
flow strains simultaneously.
 
186
One or two defaults may not necessarily pose a serious threat. But 
as we saw with Lehman Brothers in 2008,
 If those companies now have less, not 
more, time to repay their loans, the chances of default will necessarily 
increase. 
187
The SEC should be seeking to lengthen the potential time for greater 
reflection and intervention, by both private parties and regulators, in 
future moments of financial stress. But these new maturity requirements 
do the opposite. In essence, the SEC appears to have purchased a minor 
reduction in risk to the shareholders of money market funds with a major 
increase in risk to the entire system of credit. 
 even a single default can 
trigger market-wide problems if large investors react precipitously. If all 
money market loans have shorter maturities, then any defaults will come 
faster and more quickly—precisely the sort of cascade that will 
accelerate and exacerbate widespread panics. 
B. The Continued Use of Credit Ratings Agencies 
Perhaps the most curious decision of the SEC in response to all that 
has occurred in the past two years is its renewed endorsement of the 
credit ratings agencies.188 In its newest rules, the SEC continues to limit a 
money market fund’s investments only to securities that have been 
rated—and rated highly—by NRSROs.189
 
 185. See id. 
 If there is widespread 
consensus on the profound failure of any single component of the U.S. 
 186. See PAULSON, supra note 4, at 235. 
 187. See MCDONALD, supra note 8. 
 188. See Money Market Fund Reform Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 10,060, 10,068–
69 (Mar. 4, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 274); Frank Partnoy, Historical 
Perspectives on the Financial Crisis: Ivar Kreuger, the Credit-Rating Agencies, and Two 
Theories about the Function, and Dysfunction, of Markets, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 431,442 
(2009) [hereinafter Partnoy, Historical Perspectives] (“Over time, private use of credit 
ratings grew to mimic regulatory use. . . . Instead of using judgment to assess credit risk 
or even looking to key measures of credit risk—especially probability of default—private 
actors simply relied on ratings.”). 
 189. See Money Market Fund Reform Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 10,068. 
BIRDTHISTLE – FINAL  12/14/2010 2:22 PM 
2010:1155 Breaking Bucks 1185 
financial system during the recent crisis, surely it is with these ratings 
agencies that continued to assign their highest ratings to securitized 
bundles of ultimately worthless subprime mortgages.190
The SEC argues for the continued use of these agencies as a “screen 
on credit quality.”
 Yet when 
regulations require the use of such agencies, these agencies will continue 
to operate and, very likely, to continue to mislead investors with false 
assurances as to the safety of investments. Rather than attempting to 
swaddle the dangers of money market investments with misleading credit 
ratings, the SEC should be doing all it can to inform investors that the 
risks of these funds are real and potentially expensive. No regulation—
by the SEC or any other financial regulator—should continue to rely on 
these privileged and prodigal NRSROs. 
191 But the SEC has also been quick to emphasize that 
the advisors of money market funds are legally obliged to “perform an 
independent credit analysis of every security purchased.”192
In light of this requirement of an independent credit analysis by the 
fund’s sponsor, the continued use of the agencies remains truly 
perplexing. As Professor Partnoy and many others argue, the credit 
agencies suffer from serious and irredeemable capture.
 
193 That is, 
agencies rate only the securities of issuers who pay them for precisely 
that service. Naturally, issuers who seek high ratings will migrate their 
business to agencies that offer favorable ratings, leading to systemic 
grade inflation by all agencies that wish to remain in business.194
These artificially high ratings are worse than useless because, with 
the regulatory imprimatur of the SEC, they falsely assure investors that 
investments are stronger and safer than they truly are. Having no such 
assurance might prompt investors—or their intermediaries—to conduct 
their own due diligence or at least to exercise caution.
 
195
Dissenting SEC Commissioner Kathleen Casey notes that ratings 
and their use by the SEC “have long acted as a crutch rather than a 
safeguard for many investors, creating a false sense of comfort and 
protection and effectively encouraging their use as a substitute for due 
 But learning 
that a security has a AAA rating might coax investors into transactions 
that are, in fact, far more perilous. 
 
 190. See, e.g., Kia Dennis, The Ratings Game: Explaining Rating Agency 
Failures in the Build Up to the Financial Crisis, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1111, 1113 (2009).  
 191. Press Release, SEC, SEC Approves Money Market Fund Reforms to Better 
Protect Investors (Jan. 27, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-14.htm. 
 192. Id.  
 193. See Dennis, supra note 190, at 1124–25; Partnoy, Historical Perspectives, 
supra note 188, at 438, 442; Frank Partnoy, Siskel and Ebert, supra note 36. 
 194. See Partnoy, Siskel and Ebert, supra note 36, at 623. 
 195. Id. at 623–24. 
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diligence - not only on the part of funds and investors, but regulators as 
well.”196
As with the foregoing maturity requirements, the SEC’s reliance 
upon ratings agencies whose abysmal performance has been widely 
condemned increases rather than decreases the likelihood of future runs 
on money market funds and consequential failures of the credit markets. 
 
C. The Retention of a Fixed NAV 
A false sense of security is perhaps the single largest peril of money 
market funds today. These funds convey an artificial impression that they 
are as safe as bank accounts, when recent events so clearly demonstrate 
that they are not. This sense of security is certainly exacerbated by the 
continued reliance upon ratings agencies, but the chief culprit in 
propagating this impression is the fixed NAV, because it so closely 
resembles the fixed obligations of a bank account. Yet in its newest 
rulemaking, the SEC has missed an ideal opportunity to return to the 
floating NAV that money market funds originally used.197
The SEC justifies its continued permission for fixed NAVs by 
pointing out that investors enjoy tax and accounting advantages through 
this mechanism.
 
198
The fixed NAV has been defended with an admixture of stare 
decisis and free-market economics. Professor Mercer Bullard, for 
example, has argued that: 
 Even assuming that claim is true, it would be so only 
because of regulatory largesse, not because of any inherent design 
innovation. Indeed, it would beg the question why these funds, and not 
all funds, should be allowed to enjoy such preferential treatment. Or, the 
related query, why should not all funds—regardless of their pricing 
structure—be granted equal tax and accounting treatment? The SEC is, 
in effect, providing a regulatory subsidy to one specific kind of 
investment over others. 
Money market funds have always been viewed as bank 
equivalents. A conversion to floating-NAV [money market 
funds] would likely reverse three decades of market-driven 
disintermediation from banks to [money market funds] and 
thereby eliminate competition for bank deposit accounts, 
 
 196. Kathleen L. Casey, Comm’r, SEC, Statement on Proposing Release, Money 
Market Fund Reform (Jan. 27, 2010). 
 197. See Money Market Fund Reform Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 10,060, 10,060 
(Mar. 4, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 274). 
 198. See Money Market Fund Reform Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,688, 
32,688–89 (July 8, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 274). 
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increase the cost of short-term capital intermediation, and risk a 
destabilizing run on [money market funds].199
Bullard offered this defense of the fixed NAV primarily in advocating 
for government insurance of money market funds, not in defending the 
new SEC rules or status quo ante.
  
200 Yet one might take issue with 
claims that money market funds and bank accounts have always been 
equivalents and that whatever happened over the past three decades was 
“market-driven.” When first offered, money market accounts featured 
floating NAVs and did not offer the array of check-writing, ATM, and 
other bank-like conveniences (because those conveniences require the 
greater predictability of fixed pricing).201 Thus, the two investments were 
not always equivalents; when money market funds first appeared, they 
were quite different from bank accounts. The two became equivalents 
only through the concerted efforts of fund sponsors to achieve legislative 
and optical similarities to bank accounts. Moreover, claims that the 
inflow of money to money markets has been “market-driven” ignore the 
predicate effects of regulation upon available market choices. Indeed, 
such a claim is akin to suggesting that the growth of high fructose corn 
syrup ahead of imported sugar is “market-driven” without 
acknowledging the role that massive government subsidies play in the 
success of one of those sweeteners.202
Both the SEC and the fund industry argue that, through disclosure, 
fund investors are disabused of the notion that money market funds are 
guaranteed or insured in the manner of bank accounts.
 
203 Indeed, they 
claim that all investors in these funds are acutely aware that their 
investments are subject to loss.204
 
 199. Bullard, supra note 144, at 28. 
 But nowhere in the SEC’s copious 
rulemaking materials is any empirical evidence produced to that effect. 
When one considers the history of the growth of these funds, one sees a 
consistent and concerted attempt by fund sponsors to make money 
market funds appear as similar as possible to bank accounts. For the 
industry now to claim that investors never bought their ruse is cheeky at 
best and deceptive at worst. 
 200. Id. at 1, 28. 
 201. See supra text accompanying notes 23–27. 
 202. See, e.g., Stephen D. Sugarman & Nirit Sandman, Fighting Childhood 
Obesity Through Performance-Based Regulation of the Food Industry, 56 DUKE L.J. 
1403, 1432 (“The federal government directly subsidizes certain farming interests in 
ways that allow them to keep their prices down and increase quantities consumed. The 
subsidy of corn-based sugar products is especially troubling in this regard . . . .”).  
 203. See Money Market Fund Reform Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at  
32,709–10. 
 204. See id. at 32,710. 
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D. The Relevance of the Primary Fund’s Failure 
Even if one were to view the rationales and arguments supporting 
the SEC’s new rules in the light most favorable to the SEC, the failure of 
the Reserve Primary Fund ineffably alters the future calculus for these 
funds. Whatever investors and the capital markets may once have 
believed about money market funds has been altered fundamentally by 
the events of late 2008. When the U.S. government stepped in to 
guarantee these funds against failure, it crystallized the suspicion that 
money market funds are, in fact, insured against loss. Or at least the 
government implicitly provides that insurance.205 But perhaps the only 
thing worse than operating without insurance is operating with insurance 
for which none of the players pays. That scenario is always the prelude to 
moral hazard and future failures.206
If a financial instrument operates with a fixed return, it must either 
arrange a mechanism to guarantee that return or be prepared to suffer 
runs at the first suspicion that the return is no longer fixed.
 
207 But money 
market funds attempted to have the best of both worlds: a fixed return 
without the costs of a guarantee. In retrospect, the industry argues that it 
never claimed to offer a fixed return. Industry supporters argue that 
disclosure documents clearly state that money market funds are not 
insured and are at risk.208 The events of 2008, however, demonstrate that 
the financial authorities simply cannot afford to allow this enormous 
sector of the economy to fail.209
These events have taught investors that the failure of even one 
money market fund may create systemic dysfunction and that the U.S. 
government will not allow such a failure. In the future, perhaps events 
will not conspire to create the same degree of damage from the breaking 
of a single buck, but some fund sponsors may still be prepared to 
gamble. If money market funds continue to operate without paying 
insurance to cover their returns, problems are more likely to occur in the 
future than they were before. Individual fund sponsors can now make 
riskier investments in higher yielding securities, either to capture market 
share or to increase profits, all the while knowing that if they overreach 
and their funds fail, the government may be standing by as an insurer. 
Again, Booth offers a specific prediction: “Presumably, it is only a 
 
 
 205. See Booth, supra note 120, at 65 (“[T]he illusion that MMFs were risk-free 
created a moral hazard that led depositors to move more funds into MMFs than they 
should have.”). 
 206. See, e.g., David S. Miller, Note, Insurance as Contract: The Argument for 
Abandoning the Ambiguity Doctrine, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1849, 1863 (1988). 
 207. See FRANKEL & KIRSCH, supra note 43, at 463. 
 208. See Money Market Fund Reform Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 32,712. 
 209. See PAULSON, supra note 4. 
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matter of time before someone offers an uninsured [money market funds] 
with higher returns.”210 Yet a basic premise of all insurance is that those 
who take the risks must be the ones to internalize the costs of the 
insurance. When individuals do not pay for their own mistakes, moral 
hazard abounds.211
Thus, even if the SEC’s rationales were compelling in a vacuum, 
they are no longer so. The SEC must now address the very real sense of 
an implicit guarantee that greatly increases the moral hazard and 
systemic risk associated with these funds. 
 
III. NEW SOLUTIONS FOR MONEY MARKET FUNDS 
The SEC could quickly remediate the perils of moral hazard and 
systemic risk in money market funds and credit markets simply by 
reducing the level of obfuscation in its current approach. By adopting the 
lessons of neoclassical,212 behavioral,213
A. Neoclassical Economics and a Floating NAV 
 or prudential regulation, the 
agency could quickly encode a new set of rules to bring greater 
transparency to this vital and once-ignored sector of the economy. Two 
simple but fundamental changes could accomplish a great deal of this 
work: either return to the floating NAV or establish an insurance facility 
to guarantee deposits in money market funds. 
Neoclassical law and economic theory emphasizes the primacy of 
market forces in achieving optimal social welfare. As Professors Ronald 
Gilson and Reinier Kraakman argued in their seminal article two decades 
ago, the efficient capital market hypothesis—and its reliance on a market 
for information—is “the context in which serious discussion of the 
regulation of financial markets takes place.”214 Neoclassical theory 
promotes a disclosure-based approach to financial regulation, positing 
that through a sufficiently competitive market for information, investors 
and their agents will quickly and effectively process risk and price in the 
capital markets.215
 
 210. Booth, supra note 120, at 65. 
 Ostensibly following this theoretical framework, the 
SEC itself states publicly that “[o]nly through the steady flow of timely, 
 211. See Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 145, at 489 (“The Lehman/Reserve Primary 
Fund situation illustrates the difficult choice between providing a government rescue to 
prevent systemic consequences . . . and limiting moral hazard.”) 
 212. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 15. 
 213. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 168. 
 214. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market 
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 550 (1989). 
 215. See id. at 631–32. 
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comprehensive, and accurate information can people make sound 
investment decisions.”216
But the SEC’s approach toward the regulation of money market 
funds is fundamentally in conflict with transparency. Indeed, the SEC’s 
rules have done much to obscure the true risks associated with money 
market funds by abetting the efforts by fund sponsors to make their funds 
resemble bank accounts. Were the pricing mechanism of these funds to 
revert to their original floating status, all fund investors would be 
reminded daily—even without digging deep into formal disclosure 
documents—of the possible losses from their investments. Yet the 
conservative nature of money market portfolios would limit losses and, 
on occasion, even offset them with gains. 
  
1. TRANSPARENCY 
The SEC appears to accept the industry’s contention that statements 
in official prospectuses and Statements of Additional Information 
effectively convey to all money market fund investors the claim that their 
fund investments are perpetually at risk.217 Yet a great deal of scholarly 
work has demonstrated the very real limitations of financial disclosure.218 
Few investors read these documents; fewer still comprehend their import 
and act accordingly.219
These limitations would be true even if the money market fund 
industry had not spent a great deal of effort attempting to override these 
disclosures. Although all fund sponsors file their legally required 
disclaimers, they wink at those statements of risk through the enormous 
promotional effort they put into far more visible intimations of stability 
in these funds. Money market funds are regularly referred to as “cash or 
cash equivalent;”
 
220 they are furnished with check-writing and ATM 
privileges, and they are provided with the all-important fixed price that 
no other investment fund is permitted to use.221
 
 216. The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains 
Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last modified  
Sept. 20, 2010). 
 
 217. See Money Market Fund Reform Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,688, 
32,710 (July 8, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 274).  
 218. See, e.g., James D. Cox & John W. Payne, Mutual Fund Expense 
Disclosures: A Behavioral Perspective, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 907, 926 (2005) (explaining 
why, under current disclosure practices, investors cannot be relied upon to make rational 
choices). 
 219. See id. 
 220. James J. Eccleston, SEC Issues Helpful Investment Guide, CHI. DAILY L. 
BULL., May 8, 2006, at 5. 
 221. See FRANKEL & KIRSCH, supra note 43, at 463. 
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Indeed, the success of the industry’s efforts to assure investors of 
the stability of money market funds became clearest during the panic of 
2008. Even though the Primary Fund stood to lose less than 2 percent of 
its value, the breaking of its buck represented a profound violation of 
trust—investors ran for the exits immediately.222
But if we accept the contention that most investors understood how 
money market funds operate, what then ought to be done about the 
benighted few? Should financial regulation of money market funds 
accommodate the wise or the foolish? One might argue that the industry 
filed their required disclosure announcing that money market fund 
investments were at risk, and that anyone who failed to read or to believe 
those warnings is a fool and, further, that crafting regulation to 
accommodate imprudent customers is a poor policy. While such an 
approach might be reasonable for sophisticated financial sectors, in 
which counterparties possess equal bargaining power and information, it 
makes less sense for an inherently retail product.
 If they had believed that 
their investments were truly at risk, that their assets might fluctuate a few 
pennies up or down on any given day, then panic on that scale ought to 
have been very unlikely. 
223 But what about the 
presence of institutional investors in this sector—won’t they protect the 
interests of individual investors? While sophisticated players do often 
discipline a market to the benefit of all participants,224 in this scenario, 
retail and institutional investors often invest in separate money market 
funds.225
Professor Gordon follows his lapidary analysis of the flaws of 
money market funds with a specific recommendation along these lines: 
“A minimum reform strategy should create a sharp divide between retail 
MMFs (“RMMFs”) and institutional MMFs (“IMMFs”).”
 Thus in the absence of regulation that reasonably accounts for 
the ability—and inability—of retail investors, problems will assuredly 
occur. 
226 He then 
outlines ways in which the bifurcated species of funds ought to be 
regulated differently. As a practical matter, this separation is largely 
already in place, as many fund sponsors offer funds with similar 
portfolios but different prices to different clients.227
 
 222. See Mamudi & Burton, supra note 2. 
 And, as the lessons 
of mutual fund pricing demonstrate, such a separation is not always 
 223. See generally William A. Birdthistle, Investment Indiscipline: A Behavioral 
Approach to Mutual Fund Jurisprudence, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 61 [hereinafter Birdthistle, 
Investment Indiscipline ]. 
 224. See id. at 72. 
 225. See id. at 72–73. 
 226. Letter from Jeffrey N. Gordon to Elizabeth M. Murphy, supra note 35,  
at 9. 
 227. Birdthistle, supra note 223, at 73. 
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positive. When institutional and retail investors do not invest in identical 
funds, the prices of those similar products may quickly diverge. Thus, 
Professor Gordon’s proposal to reduce risk might lead to a disparity in 
pricing. 
Yet proponents of these rules might contend that no change is 
needed here. Money market funds have broken the buck only twice in 
their history and, both times, investors stood to lose only pennies on the 
dollar.228
Such rare and minimal risks, so the argument might go, simply do 
not warrant significant changes to an industry. This argument glosses 
over two problems: first, without changes, the frequency of future 
mishaps is much higher today than before the 2008 meltdown; second, 
the relatively minor losses to fund shareholders completely omits the 
massive and profound losses that would have accrued in the capital 
markets if the federal government had not intervened. As the director of 
the SEC’s Division of Investment Management, Andrew J. Donohue, put 
it, “the events of the fall of 2008 showed that money market funds are 
susceptible to runs, particularly by institutional investors. . . . [and] 
precipitated a massive intervention with respect to money market funds 
that many in the government would not like to see repeated.”
 Indeed, some might say that the system operated correctly this 
time, with the system avoiding collapse and Reserve shareholders losing 
just 1 percent of their investment. 
229
Each of the counterarguments to a floating NAV rests on the 
implicit and remarkable assumption that the market will perform better if 
investors are offered less transparency and furnished with an inaccurate 
view of these funds. Yet decades of financial theory and empirical 
studies demonstrate the opposite: that with greater transparency comes 
healthier, more efficient, and more effective markets.
 
230
 
 228. See supra text accompanying notes 4–7. 
 If the SEC 
emphasized the perils of these funds to investors, many investors may 
still choose to invest in them (albeit fully cognizant of the risks), while 
others may choose either to invest in less risky, less rewarding 
alternatives, such as bank accounts, or more risky, more rewarding 
alternatives, such as short-term bond funds. Without a regulatory thumb 
on the scale, the market could provide a better picture of the price and 
risk of these securities, and investors would not operate in an artificial 
bubble ignorant of growing systemic risks. 
 229. Andrew J. Donohue, Director, Div. of Inv. Mgmt., SEC, Remarks Before 
the Practicing Law Institute’s Investment Management Institute (Apr. 8, 2010). 
 230. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 214, at 552, 554. 
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2. EQUALIZING REGULATORY BENEFITS AND BURDENS 
With one concerted step, the SEC could level the competitive field 
both between money market funds and all other mutual funds as well as 
between money market funds and bank accounts. By reverting to the 
regulatory framework that the SEC maintained during the early years of 
money market funds—in which they, like all mutual funds, were required 
to use a floating NAV231
If the SEC repealed the use of amortized-cost accounting—which it 
could do with a straightforward amendment of Rule 2a-7
—and systemic foibles of this investment could 
be policed with robust market mechanisms. 
232—money 
market funds would then be obliged to use mark-to-market accounting.233
If a money market fund experienced the collapse of one of its 
investments, as the Primary Fund did with its Lehman Brothers 
holdings,
 
Inasmuch as most investment advisors who sponsor money market funds 
also oversee large mutual fund complexes, the industry could quickly 
adopt this technical alteration. The price of money market funds would 
then begin to float and, shortly thereafter, investors in those funds would 
see their daily NAVs oscillate between a few pennies above and below 
the $1.00 price. This fluctuation would communicate far more effectively 
than any prospectus disclosure the fact that these funds carry the risk of 
loss and thereby help to forestall any future runs on the industry. 
234 the price of that fund would drop a few pennies lower than 
usual, but investors would not be alarmed at the violation of any sort of 
iron-clad guarantee. But even if investors did exit the fund, they would 
not trigger a run because a floating NAV is, by definition, immune to 
such phenomena.235
Certain investors, however, may greatly value the stability of the 
$1.00 price in money market funds, and a floating NAV would eliminate 
this feature. Indeed, one might argue that changing money market funds 
might reduce investor choices and permit unhealthy market 
concentrations in the remaining options. On the contrary, a wide variety 
of choices would remain. 
 
For any investor who demands the predictability of fixed balance—
in order to write checks or simply to plan future activities—a financial 
product already exists: the bank account. Similarly, bank accounts will 
 
 231. See Levin, supra note 42, at 750–53. 
 232. Id. at 750–51. 
 233. See Money Market Fund Reform Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,688, 
32,690 (July 8, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 274). 
 234. See Henriques, supra note 44, at BU13. 
 235. See supra text accompanying notes 78–82. 
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accommodate those investors with more conservative investment 
profiles. 
But bank accounts typically offer lower yields than money market 
funds.236 Certainly, that is true, primarily because bank accounts must 
pay insurance on their deposits to the FDIC. In essence, money market 
funds have received free insurance, with disastrous results and equally 
dire prospects in the absence of revisions. Money market funds, their 
investors, and their sponsors have all enjoyed higher yields by 
transferring the risk of their investments to the American taxpayers.237
For those money market investors who do prioritize a higher yield 
and will not be satisfied with bank accounts, products already exist for 
this taste: short-term bond funds. Short-term bond funds hold 
investments extremely similar to those in money market funds, but are 
structured as classic mutual funds, and thus already have floating 
NAVs.
 
Both the equities of that structure, as well as its promotion of moral 
hazard, require its termination. 
238 They carry a higher yield than bank accounts and reflect more 
accurate risks for those rewards.239
The industry argues that investors will move offshore to riskier and 
unregulated products.
 In the absence of the SEC’s 
regulatory subsidy, money market funds must reflect price and risk that 
are true reflections of the prevailing market rate. 
240 But that supposition prompts two replies: 
unlikely and so what? Unlike hedge fund investors, about whom the 
“offshore” argument is commonly deployed,241 money market investors 
are not seeking outsized returns, privacy, or investment expertise.242
 
 236. See ICI FACT BOOK, supra note 3, at 34 (noting that for the first time in the 
last fifteen years, yields on money market funds were lower than those on bank accounts 
in 2009). 
 
Onshore bank accounts and short-term bond funds already offer money 
market investors the straightforward investments they seek. Why move 
offshore when abundant and comparable investments are available next 
door? Fund sponsors contend that the market has already spoken by 
 237. An Inadequate Case for the Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2008, at A26. 
 238. See, e.g., J.P. MORGAN, JPMorgan Short Duration Bond Fund, in 
PROSPECTUS: J.P. MORGAN INCOME FUNDS 10 (July 1, 2010) (describing the investment 
strategies and holdings of this open-end mutual fund). 
 239. See, e.g., id. 
 240. See Money Market Fund Reform Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,688, 
32,718 (July 8, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 274).  
 241. E.g., Kathleen E. Lange, Note, The New Antifraud Rule: Is SEC 
Enforcement the Most Effective Way to Protect Investors from Hedge Fund Fraud?, 77 
FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 873–74 (2008). 
 242. See supra text accompanying notes 46-47. 
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pouring more than $3 trillion into these funds.243 But this argument 
ignores the enormous regulatory thumb on the scale—investors have 
chosen a product whose price is artificially low because of governmental 
intervention. Again, to attribute the popularity of corn in the United 
States to superior performance rather than to massive government 
subsidy is woefully naive, or disingenuous.244
The market for short-term paper will be largely unaffected, 
inasmuch as bank accounts and short-term bond funds will replace fixed-
rate money market funds as purchasers in accordance with the migration 
of investors. Corporate issuers of commercial paper will not care whether 
Bank of America’s savings funds or Bank of America’s money market 
funds are lending them money. Any temporary disruption to these 
channels will be replaced quickly with buyers already operating within 
the system. In short, money market funds have enjoyed thirty years of 
regulatory largesse, whose elimination effectively rectifies an old but 
growing threat. 
 Asking customers to 
purchase bank accounts or short-term bond funds, as may befit their 
preference for risk and yield, is simply a regulatory-neutral position that 
defers to market forces. 
B. Behavioral Economics and the Selection of Winners 
The work of Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler emphasizes some of 
the shortcomings in neoclassical economic theory.245 The market is 
deficient in processing information, they argue, because of biases, 
distractions, and shortcomings in so many market participants.246 Rather 
than leaving all decisions to a completely unregulated agora, therefore, 
regulators should be prepared to offer “libertarian paternalism” in the 
form of choice architecture.247
 
 243. See Money Market Fund Reform Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 32,689; 
Sugarman & Sandman, supra note 202, at 1432 (discussing corn subsidies); see also 
Navigating New Rules: Q&A w/ Stephen Keen, MONEY FUND INTELLIGENCE, Feb. 2010, 
at 1, 3–4 (“People who actually have money invested in funds, particularly individuals, 
uniformly said, ‘Don’t do that. I don’t want a fluctuating product, and I don’t want to 
have to put my money in a bank. I like what money market funds do. I know I have a risk 
of loss. I accept that.’”). 
 That is, without actually restricting the 
choices of market participants, regulators may still privilege certain 
options over others. 
 244. See D. Daniel Sokol, Limiting Anticompetitive Interventions That Benefit 
Special Interests, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 119, 127 (2009). 
 245. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 168. 
 246. See id. 
 247. Id. 
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As an excellent example of behavioral theory applied to financial 
regulation, consider the Pension Protection Act of 2006.248 Prior to that 
law, any proceeds employees saved in their retirement accounts that they 
did not allocate to a specific investment were required, by law, to be held 
as cash.249 In many cases, the obliviousness or busyness of employees 
would result in retirement assets languishing well below levels necessary 
for healthy savings.250 The Pension Protection Act permitted retirement 
administrators to direct unallocated investments into conservative, 
passively managed, broadly diversified mutual funds instead.251 In both 
scenarios, employees could easily change the allocation of their 
investments. The behavioral approach, however, took account of 
shortcomings in the existing approach and simply altered the default 
setting, which has resulted in far higher savings rates for plan 
participants.252
In the context of money market funds, one might argue that 
behavioral economic theory might justify the SEC’s behavior even if 
neoclassical theory does not. For instance, one could argue that the SEC 
has surveyed the available options and simply privileged money market 
funds for their optimal combination of safety, yield, and convenience. 
Indeed, the argument might proceed, requiring a floating NAV might 
exacerbate future runs because investors might panic sooner if they see a 
fund’s value declining or because the “true” price of short-term debt 
becomes highly unreliable during moments of market stress. 
 
But, again, investors simply cannot trigger a run on any financial 
portfolio that promises only to pay them a pro rata portion of whatever 
the portfolio holds. Runs occur when investors are promised more than a 
pro rata portion, and thus have an incentive to be the first to withdraw 
their portions before the corpus is exhausted.253
 
 248. See Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 624, 120 Stat. 
980 (2006). 
 More importantly, the 
SEC has not simply placed an existing financial option at the top of a 
menu of choices; it has, through rulemaking, affirmatively altered the 
nature of investment options by giving one an advantage that could not 
exist without regulatory intervention. 
 249. See Birdthistle, Investment Indiscipline, supra note 223, at 67. 
 250. See, e.g., James J. Choi et al., For Better or for Worse: Default Effects and 
401(k) Savings Behavior, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE ECONOMICS OF AGING 81, 81–121 
(David A. Wise ed., 2004). 
 251. Pension Protection Act of 2006, § 624(a)(5). 
 252. Birdthistle, Investment Indiscipline, supra note 223, at 67. 
 253. See supra text accompanying notes 77–81. 
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C. Prudential Regulation and Mandatory Insurance 
Regulation is, of course, a central feature of even financial systems 
that purport to be heavily market-oriented and laissez-faire.254 Indeed, in 
the United States, earnest debates about financial oversight do not 
seriously contemplate either a truly unregulated system or a truly 
controlled system—the debate is largely one of degree. Prudential, or 
merit, regulation therefore often plays some role.255
With every financial instrument, some party must be prepared to 
absorb the loss of unfortunate market events. A floating NAV places the 
risk of that loss on investors in a fund. A fixed NAV requires that some 
other party do so. Indeed, a fixed price always carries an assurance, 
express or implied, that someone will make customers whole if the 
investment fails.
 One of the few 
widely celebrated examples of financial-merit regulation is the success of 
the FDIC’s record of insuring bank accounts. If the SEC declines to 
require money market funds to use a floating NAV, then it should adopt 
some equivalent system of insurance. 
256 In the events involving the Primary Fund, the federal 
government placed billions of public dollars at risk to avoid collapse. In 
bank accounts, the FDIC does so as well, but only after being paid to do 
so by depositors through their banks.257
1. THE EXISTING, UNSPOKEN INSURANCE REGIME 
 A few variations on this 
insurance scheme might be equally useful in the context of money 
market funds. 
The first option would be to continue with the current regime. 
Currently, money market funds offer the strong suggestion to investors 
that their investments are stable, safe, and secure. When that assurance 
proved false, as it did with the Reserve Fund, the Federal government 
guaranteed depositors against loss.258
 
 254. See, e.g., Mohammad H. Fadel, Riba, Efficiency, and Prudential 
Regulation: Preliminary Thoughts, 25 WIS. INT’L L.J. 655, 695 (2008) (explaining that 
Islamic financial law adopts a laissez-faire attitude towards business dealing, but also has 
regulatory aspects). 
 That is, the government offered 
implicit insurance for money market funds without charging specific 
 255. See id. at 657 (arguing that Islamic financial law regulation is part of a 
larger prudential scheme). 
 256. See Henriques, supra note 44. 
 257. Who is the FDIC?, FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, 
http://www.fdic.gov/about/learn/symbol/WhoistheFdIC.pdf (last updated Aug. 11, 2010). 
 258. See Press Release, U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, supra note 10. 
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insurance premia to any of the participants—investors, funds, sponsors, 
lenders—in this system.259
As we have seen, insurance that is given to parties who do not pay 
for it cultivates significant moral hazard and, if left in place, provides 
every incentive for participants to increase the risk of their activities. 
Investors have every incentive to put their money into money market 
funds offering the very highest yield, while funds and sponsors have 
every incentive to choose investments with the highest degree of risk and 
reward. If these decisions turn out to be poor ones, the loss will be borne 
by all U.S. taxpayers. 
 
Such a system, needless to say, will greatly exacerbate, not mitigate, 
the future likelihood of runs on money market funds and systemic risk in 
the capital markets. In light of the equally problematic rules shortening 
maturities in money market funds, the status quo would appear to be 
untenable. 
2. SELF-INSURANCE 
A second alternative would be to require the sponsors and advisors 
of money market funds to insure their funds themselves.260 Such a 
system has been in place informally for several decades.261 With two 
very notable exceptions, in all previous instances in which funds have 
threatened to break their buck, their investment advisors provided self-
insurance to the fund’s investors.262
In many respects, this system most perfectly aligns the interests and 
risks of money market funds—if the people most directly responsible for 
managing the funds are also the people who stand to lose the most from 
mistakes, they will take the optimal degree of care in running the funds. 
The limitations, however, are clearly visible in cases such as the Primary 
Fund.
 That is, the advisors or their 
affiliates intervened to purchase at full value portfolio securities whose 
values had declined precipitously and threatened to break the buck. In 
essence, the advisors paid money out of their own pockets to insure the 
loss and to make fund investors whole. The advisors paid for this 
insurance through the premia of previous profits they had made from 
managing the funds. 
263
 
 259. See id. 
 Whenever the advisor simply does not have sufficient capital to 
 260. See, e.g., Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Massachusetts Health Plan: Public 
Insurance for the Poor, Private Insurance for the Wealthy, Self-Insurance for the Rest?, 
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buy its own fund, the fund will fail and the system will face collateral 
risks. Or, indeed, if fund sponsors believe the government will insure 
their losses, they will have a powerful incentive not to resuscitate their 
own failing funds. Thus a broader insurance pool is necessary to address 
the true amount of risk in these funds. 
3. COLLECTIVE INSURANCE 
A third option would be to follow the example of the banking 
industry’s collective insurance.264 Money market funds could either 
mutually or governmentally insure their risk across the entire industry by 
having all funds pay into a common pool that would rescue any fund that 
failed. Of course, all funds would have to pay insurance premia, the cost 
of which would in turn be passed through to all investors in those funds. 
That additional cost would naturally reduce the yield for all funds, but 
only by the true cost of securing these investments.265
The current system is cheaper, but only because none of the 
industry’s constituents is paying for their actual risk. Inasmuch as 
different funds operate with different risk profiles, so too could the 
premia be risk-adjusted,
 
266
CONCLUSION 
 so that the actual costs of investing with a 
guaranteed return are internalized with the most accurate allocation 
possible. Insurance certainly will not prevent future investment failures, 
but, as the FDIC has demonstrated, it can protect both investors 
individually and the capital markets more systemically. 
The shattering of the buck in the Reserve Primary Fund 
dramatically demonstrated two suspected but unspoken fears about what 
were once considered among the economy’s safest and surest 
investments. Contrary to the industry’s long attempt to conflate money 
market funds with bank accounts, the global markets witnessed the 
serious magnitude of the risk that funds carry, not solely to themselves 
and their investors, but also to the broader credit and capital markets. 
When the Primary Fund stumbled, investors fled what they feared were 
Potemkin bank accounts, and the credit markets promptly seized.267
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Notwithstanding this vivid demonstration, the SEC’s regulatory 
response has been disappointingly incoherent and ineffective. Shunning 
the principles and guidance of widely accepted legal economic theories, 
the SEC adopted instead not just an incoherent set of risk-reduction 
measures but also an ineffectual one. By shortening the permissible 
maturities of money market funds, the SEC has actually increased the 
likely velocity and force of future runs without making any 
compensatory effort to address the newly enhanced peril of moral 
hazard. 
Neoclassical and behavioral economic theories proffer two 
alternative approaches that would eliminate the regulatory subsidy of 
these investments while improving the health of the capital markets. By 
either replacing fixed NAVs with floating ones or, instead, requiring the 
industry to adopt insurance to cover their fixed obligations, the SEC 
might increase the transparency and long-term well-being of a 
cornerstone of the U.S. economy. 
 
